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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
It is possible that in the future every laptop, handheld device, and desktop 
PC is connected wirelessly to the enterprise network. Today, enterprises are 
rapidly deploying wireless networks based on standards such as Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11b, which offers constant 
access to enterprise intranet, extranet, and Internet data and services. Compared 
to traditional wired networks, wireless networks offer mobility, giving users 
access to enterprise data anywhere and anytime; flexibility, reducing deployment 
and network reconfiguration costs; and convenience. These proven 
conveniences of wireless networks have led to widespread deployment in the 
consumer, industrial and military sectors. 
However, there are some concerns associated with wireless networks. 
The greatest of which is security. Military and civil network managers must 
ensure that new vulnerabilities are not introduced to their enterprise network 
when a wireless LAN is deployed. At the same time, they must ensure that 
wireless transmissions are safe from eavesdropping, illegal data alteration and 
denial of service attacks. 
A popular implementation of wireless networks is the IEEE 802.11 
WLANs. The widespread deployment makes IEEE 802.11-based networks an 
attractive target for potential attackers. Indeed, research has demonstrated basic 
flaws in 802.11’s encryption mechanisms [1] and authentication protocols [2] – 
ultimately leading to the creation of a series of protocol extensions and 
replacements (e.g., WPA, 802.11i, 802.1X) to address these problems. However, 
most of this work has focused primarily on the requirements of access control 
and confidentiality, rather than availability. Recent works [3] has highlighted the 






This thesis presents results from a simulation study evaluating the 
vulnerabilities of the IEEE 802.11 medium access control (MAC) protocol against 
malicious Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Attacks targeting the identity 
vulnerability and virtual carrier sense mechanism are simulated and various 
countermeasures are subsequently implement to investigate their effectiveness 





II. IEEE 802.11 STANDARD 
A brief description of the IEEE 802.11 standard is provided in this chapter. 
This chapter focuses on the key areas of the IEEE 802.11 protocol that are 
pertinent to this work, and is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview 
of the capabilities of the protocol. Detailed descriptions of the complete standard 
can be found in [4] and [5], which provided the basis of this chapter. 
 
 
A. IEEE 802.11 ARCHITECTURE 
The architecture of the IEEE 802.11 WLAN is designed to support a 
network where most decision-making is distributed to the mobile stations. This 
architecture has several advantages, including being very tolerant of faults in all 
the WLAN equipment and eliminating any possible bottlenecks a centralized 
architecture would introduce. The architecture is very flexible, easily supporting 
both small, transient networks and large semi permanent or permanent networks.  
The IEEE 802.11 WLAN architecture is built around a basic service set 
(BSS). The BSS consists of two or more wireless mobile stations, which can 
communicate with each other. There are two types of BSS. The first type being 
the independent BSS (IBSS), where mobile stations can communicate directly 
with each other (Figure 1).  Mobile stations must be in communication range of 




Figure 1.   Independent Basic Service Set (BSS) (After [4]) 
 
The second type of BSS is the infrastructure BSS. The mobile stations 
communicate with each other through an Access Point (AP) (Figure 2). The AP 
can act as a bridge to connect the WLAN to a wired network. More importantly, 
the AP is the central node for all communications in the WLAN. All frames must 
be sent to the AP first, and the AP will retransmit the frame to intended 
destination mobile station in the BSS. This consumes twice as much bandwidth 
as compared to a one-link communication in an IBSS. However, the AP provides 
for traffic buffering if a destination station is not ready to receive the message. 
 
Figure 2.   Infrastructure BSS (After [4]) 
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A set of infrastructure BSS can be string together through the APs to form 
an Extended Service Set (ESS). This facilitates the movement of mobile stations 
from one BSS to another BSS within the ESS (Figure 3). The APs communicate 
among themselves to forward traffic between each BSS. The APs communicate 
via an abstract medium called the Distribution System (DS). The DS is the 
backbone of the WLAN and may be constructed of either wired or wireless 
networks.  
 
Figure 3.   Extended Service Set (ESS) (After [4]) 
 
B. DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
The DS is the mechanism by which one AP communicates with another to 
exchange frames for stations in their BSSes, forward frames to follow mobile 
stations from one BSS to another, and exchange frames with wired networks, if 
any. The DS is not necessarily a network, as long as the services it must provide 
exists. Thus the DS may be a wired network; e.g. 802.3 Ethernet, or a dedicated 
black box providing the required services. 
 
C. SERVICES 
The IEEE 802.11 defines a total of 9 types of services, divided into 2 




1. Station Services 
There are 4 station services; authentication, deauthentication, privacy and 
data delivery. These 4 services provide the WLAN with similar functions to those 
that are expected of a wired network. An authenticated mobile station is similar to 
a physically connected station in a wired network. Similarly, a deauthentication of 
a mobile station corresponds to disconnecting a station from the wired network. 
The authentication service is used to prove the identity of the mobile station to 
another. As such, only authenticated users are allowed to use the WLAN. The 
deauthentication service disconnects the mobile station from the WLAN and that 
station can no longer access service of the WLAN. 
The privacy service of the IEEE 802.11 is designed to provide an 
equivalent level of protection for data traversing the WLAN as provided by a 
wired network. This service protects the data only as it traverses the wireless 
medium, and is not designed to provide end-to-end protection in a 
heterogeneous network. 
The data transmission service is probably the most utilized service of the 
mobile station. This service is responsible for reliably delivering data frames from 
the Medium Access Control (MAC) of one mobile station to one or more other 
stations. 
 
2. Distribution Services 
The 5 distribution services of the protocol are association, reassociation, 
disassociation, distribution and integration. These distribution services function to 
allow mobile stations to roam freely within an ESS and to allow the IEEE 802.11 
WLAN to be connected with a wired LAN infrastructure. 
The association service is used to make a logical connection between a 
mobile station and an AP. This logical connection is necessary in order for the 
DS to know where and how to deliver data to the mobile station. The logical 
connection is also necessary for the AP to accept data frames from the mobile 
station and to allocate resources to support the mobile station.  
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The reassociation service is similar to the association service, with the 
exception that it includes information about the AP with which a mobile station 
has been previously associated. A mobile station will use the reassociation 
service repeatedly as it roams about the ESS, losing contact with the AP with 
which it has been associated with, and thus needing to be associated with a new 
AP as the station proceeds to within the new AP’s coverage zone. By using 
reassociation service, a mobile station provides information to the new AP to 
which it will be associated, that allows that new AP to contact the AP with which 
the mobile station was previously associated, to obtain frames that may be 
waiting there for delivery to the mobile station. 
The disassociation service is used either to force a mobile station to 
associate with an AP or for a mobile station to inform an AP that it no longer 
requires the services of the WLAN. An AP can uses this service if it wishes to 
inform mobile stations that it can no longer provide them with services to the 
WLAN. This can be due to network overloading, or network shutting down. 
An AP determines how to deliver the frames it receives by using the 
distribution service. When a mobile station sends a frame to the AP for delivery 
to another station, the AP invokes the distribution service to determine if the 
frame should be forwarded to another AP for onward transmission or to 
retransmit the frame back into the AP’s BSS. 
The integration service functions to connect the IEEE 802.11 WLAN to 
other LANs. This connection may include one or more wired LANs, or other IEEE 
802.11 WLANS. This service translates IEEE 802.11 frames to frames that may 
traverse other networks, and vice versa. This service is similar to the service 
provided by multi protocol enabled router in the Internet. 
 
D. INTERACTION BETWEEN SOME SERVICES 
The authentication / deauthentication services and association/ 
disassociation services are used by the mobile stations to maintain two 
independent variables. These two variables; authentication state and association 
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state, are used in a simple state machine, which determines the order in which 
certain services must be invoked and when a station may begin using the data 
delivery service. A station may be authenticated with many different stations or 
APs simultaneously. However, it may only be associated with one station or AP 
at a time. 
Stations always begin in state 1, when it is neither authenticated nor 
associated with any other station or AP. When in state 1, the mobile station has 
only access to those services that allow the station to discover the WLAN and the 
authentication service.  If the station is successful in authenticating with another 
station or AP, the station will transit to state 2. (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4.   State Machine of Mobile Station (After [4]) 
 
When a mobile station transits from state 1 to state 2; i.e. it successfully 
authenticates with an AP or station, the authentication variable is set to true, and 
the association variable remains false. In state 2, the mobile station can access 
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additional services that allow the station to associate, reassociate and 
disassociate with another station or AP. If the mobile station is not successful in 
becoming associated, the mobile station will remain in state 2. When in state 2, 
the mobile station receives a deauthentication notification, the mobile station will 
return to state 1, and the authentication variable will be set to false.   
When in state 2, the mobile station successfully associates with another 
station or AP, its association variable will be set to true and the station will make 
a transition to state 3. In state 3, a mobile station is allowed to use all frame types 
and the data delivery service. The mobile station will remain in state 3, until it 
receives either a disassociation or deauthentication notification. 
A station must react to frames it receives in each of the states, even those 
that are disallowed for a particular state. For example, a mobile station in state 1 
receives an association frame from another station, the mobile station must 
respond with a deauthentication frame. This mandatory response forces the 
station that sent the disallowed frames to make a transition to the proper state in 
the state diagram and thus allowing it to proceed properly towards state 3. 
  
E. MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL 
The IEEE 802.11 medium access control (MAC) supplies the functionality 
required to provide a reliable delivery mechanism for user data over noisy, 
unreliable wireless media. Although the data delivery itself is based on an 
asynchronous, best-effort, connectionless delivery of MAC layer data, the frame 
exchange protocol at the MAC level does significantly improves on the reliability 
of data delivery over wireless media [5]. It does this while also providing advance 
LAN services, equal to or beyond those of existing wired LANs. 
The fundamental access method of IEEE 802.11 MAC is a Distributed 
Coordination Function (DCF) that provides controlled access method to the 
shared wireless medium, also known as Carrier-Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). CSMA/CA is similar to the collision detection 
access method deployed by IEEE 802.3 Ethernet LANs, but due to the wireless 
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media, it is not feasible for collision detection in the media, as such, an 
avoidance strategy is adopted. 
The third function of the IEEE 802.11 MAC is to protect the data that it 
delivers. As it is difficult to contain a WLAN within any physical perimeters, the 
IEEE 802.11 MAC provides a privacy service; Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), 
which encrypt the data with RC4 cryptographic process before sending it over the 
wireless medium. 
Apart from DCF, another method of media access control featured in the 
IEEE 802.11 protocol is the Point Coordination Function (PCF). Although DCF is 
the primary access control method used, it can also co-exist with PCF. Figure 5 
illustrates the MAC Sub layer Architecture that allows for the coexistence of both 
functions. 
 
Figure 5.   IEEE 802.11 MAC Architecture (After [4]) 
 
DCF is used in both independent and infrastructure networks; whereas, 
PCF is an optional access method and used only in infrastructure network 
configurations. In the infrastructure network, a point coordinator (PC) controls 
access to the medium permitting the DCF and PCF to coexist.  
 
F. INTERFRAME SPACE (IFS) 
A station needs to listen to the medium for a period of time before deciding 
if the medium is carrying any transmission. If the station does not detect any 
transmission during that period of time, then the station will determine that the 
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medium is free from transmission. The IEEE 802.11 MAC recognizes four such 
timing periods, known as Interframe spacing (IFS).  The four different types of 
IFS determine the priorities of stations in accessing the medium. The first type is 
Short IFS (SIFS), used in sending an acknowledgement, Clear To Send (CTS) 
frames, and the second or subsequent frames of a fragment burst. During the 
contention-free period (CFP), a station also uses SIFS when it responds to a poll 
while a point coordinator (PC), which coordinates the communication in the 
WLAN, may use SIFS for any type of frame. A SIFS is the shortest IFS; 
consequently, provides a station with the highest priority in gaining access to the 
medium. 
The second type of IFS is the Priority IFS (PIFS). Except when responding 
to a poll by PC, a station will use PIFS during the CFP for all other purposes 
under PCF.  
The third type is a Distributed IFS (DIFS), which is used under the DCF. 
DIFS is the longest interframe space. Hence, a station waiting a DIFS period has 
the lowest priority. A point coordinator is guaranteed to gain and maintain control 
of the medium to start the CFP by employing PIFS instead of DIFS.  
The fourth type of IFS is an Extended IFS (EIFS), used when the first 
attempt to transmit a frame has failed. The EIFS is shorter than DIFS, because a 
retransmission has higher priority than a normal transmission. Figure 6 illustrates 
the relationships between the IFS. 
 
 
Figure 6.   IFS relationships (After [4]) 
12 
 
The 4 timing intervals are used to implement the two coordination 
functions; DCF and PCF, of the IEEE 802.11 protocol. 
 
G. DISTRIBUTED COORIDINATION FUNCTION 
DCF is mandatory and based on the CSMA/CA protocol. With DCF, 
802.11 stations contend for access and attempt to send frames when there is no 
other station transmitting. If another station is sending a frame, other stations are 
expected to wait until the channel is free before attempting to transmit their data. 
As a condition to accessing the medium, the MAC Layer checks the value 
of its network allocation vector (NAV), which is a counter resident at each station 
that represents the amount of time that the previous frame needs to send its 
frame. The NAV must be zero before a station can attempt to send a frame. Prior 
to transmitting a frame, a station calculates the amount of time necessary to send 
the frame based on the frame's length and data rate. The station places a value 
representing this time in the duration field in the header of the frame. The IEEE 
802.11 defines the Request-To-Send (RTS) frames and Clear-To-Send (CTS) 
frames for the purpose of medium reservation by stations. When stations receive 
the RTS or CTS frames, they examine this duration field value and use it as the 
basis for setting their corresponding NAVs. This process reserves the medium for 
the sending station. Figure 7 illustrates the process of using RTS, CTS frames to 
reserve the medium. 
An important aspect of the DCF is a random back off timer that a station 
uses if it detects a busy medium. If the channel is in use, the station must wait a 
random period of time before attempting to access the medium again. This 
ensures that multiple stations wanting to send data don't all transmit at the same 
time. The random delay causes stations to wait different periods of time and 
avoids all of them sensing the medium at exactly the same time, finding the 
channel idle, transmitting, and colliding with each other. The back off timer 
significantly reduces the number of collisions and corresponding retransmissions, 
especially when the number of active users increases. 
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With WLANs, a transmitting station can't listen for collisions while sending 
data, mainly because the station can't have it's receiver on while transmitting the 
frame. As a result, the receiving station needs to send an acknowledgement 
(ACK) if it detects no errors in the received frame. If the sending station doesn't 
receive an ACK after a specified period of time, the sending station will assume 
that there was a collision or medium interference, and retransmit the frame.  
 
 
Figure 7.   RTS / CTS / Data / ACK and NAV Setting (After [4]) 
 
H. POINT COORDINATION FUNCTION 
For supporting time-bounded delivery of data frames, the IEEE 802.11 
protocol defines the optional PCF where the access point grants access to an 
individual station to the medium by polling the station during the contention free 
period. Stations can't transmit frames unless the access point polls them first. 
The period of time for PCF-based data traffic; if enabled, occurs alternately 
between contention  periods.  
The access point polls stations according to a polling list, then switches to 
a contention period when stations use DCF. This process enables support for 
both synchronous and asynchronous modes of operation.  
However, no known wireless Network Interface Cards (NICs) or AP on the 





























III. IEEE 802.11 MAC VULNERABILITIES 
The 802.11 MAC layer incorporates additional functionality designed to 
address problems of the wireless medium. These functions include the ability to 
discover networks, join and leave networks, and coordinate access to the 
wireless medium. The vulnerabilities discussed in this chapter are a consequent 
of these additional functionalities and can be broadly placed into two categories: 
identity and media-access control [3]. 
 
A. IDENTITY VULNERABILITIES 
Identity vulnerabilities arise from the implicit trust IEEE 802.11 networks 
place in a transmitting station’s address. APs and Mobile Stations identify 
themselves in an IEEE 802.11 network by their unique 48 bit MAC addresses. 
These addresses are found in the unencrypted portion of IEEE 802.11 
communication frames. There is no mechanism in the protocol to verify the 
authenticity of the self-reported MAC address. As such, an attacker may “spoof” 
any node of his choice and request MAC-layer services on the victim’s behalf. By 
invoking certain MAC layer services, an attack can force any node to leave the 
network involuntarily.  
 
1. Deauthentication 
In infrastructure mode, all mobile stations must communicate through an 
AP.  In order to communicate with an AP, a mobile station must first authenticate 
itself with the AP. Part of the authentication framework is a message that allows 
mobile clients and access points to explicitly request deauthentication from one 
another. The deauthentication message is not authenticated using any keying 
material. As such, an attacker may either spoof the access point or the mobile 





Figure 8.   Graphical depiction of deauthentication attack (After [03]) 
 
The victim mobile station, upon receiving the deauthentication message, 
must deauthenticate itself from the AP. This response is mandated by the IEEE 
802.11 protocol.  The victim mobile station will consequently attempt to 
reauthenticate with an AP, since it still has a desire to join the network. The time 
needed to rejoin a network is a function of how aggressive the mobile station 
attempts to rejoin the network. As a condition for the attack to be successful, the 
attacker needs to repeatedly deauthenticate the victim client, each time the client 
attempts to rejoin the network. This form of deauthentication attack provides the 
attacker with the flexibility of denying access to a mobile station of choice, or rate 
limit the victim’s access. 
 
2 Disassociation 
A very similar vulnerability to the authentication protocol is the association 
protocol. A mobile station can be authenticated with multiple APs, but it must be 
associated with only one AP in order to use the data delivery service of the 
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network. An attacker can similarly exploit the unauthenticated dissociation 
message to deny or degrade a victim mobile station’s access to the network’s 
services (see Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9.   Graphical depiction of disassociation attack (After [3]) 
 
Referring to Figure 4, it can be observed that a deauthentication attack will 
always return the victim station to state 1, the lowest possible state of 
communication. In contrast, a disassociation attack will only return the victim to 
state 2. A mobile station must be in state 3 in order to use the data delivery 
service of the network. As such, the deauthentication attack is more efficient than 
the disassociation attack; as the victim mobile station needs to transit more 
states to attain state 3, comparing with a victim of a disassociation attack. This 
greater efficiency of attack can translate to lesser work required of the attacker in 
order to successfully mount the attack. 
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B. MEDIA ACCESS VULNERABILITIES 
Due to the stochastic nature of wireless communications, it is not possible 
to implement perfect collision detection mechanisms in IEEE 802.11 networks. 
As such, the protocol use a combination of physical carrier sense mechanism 
and virtual carrier sense mechanism to control access to the wireless medium, in 
order to avoid collisions. However, these two mechanisms inadvertently provide 
opportunities for an attacker to conduct DoS attacks on the mobile stations. 
In order to prioritize access to the wireless medium, the IEEE 802.11 
protocol has defined 4 IFS of different timing periods. The shortest IFS is the 
SIFS, which has a period of 20 microseconds. Before any mobile station can 
commence to use the wireless medium, each station must listen to the medium 
for one IFS period; the specific type of IFS depends on the state of 
communication of the particular mobile station. If there were no transmissions 
detected during the IFS period, the mobile station will wait a short random period 
before commencing to use the medium. The random period is imposed on the 
mobile stations to prevent multiple stations from accessing the medium 
simultaneously. If there is a collision detected during the transmission of a 
station’s data, the station will suspend its transmission and back off for a period 
of time determined by an exponential back off algorithm, before trying to access 
the medium again. An attacker can exploit the need for all stations to wait for at 
least SIFS period of time, before any station can access the medium, to conduct 
a DoS attack on all stations in the network. The attacker sends a random frame 
before the end of every SIFS cycle repeatedly. Upon detecting the random 
frame, all mobile stations will back off from accessing the medium and will be 
unable to send out their legitimate data or requests. This kind of attack demands 
a very high workload on the attacker as the attacker is expected to send out a 
frame in less than 20 microseconds, repeatedly [3].  
Another avenue of attack targets the virtual carrier sense mechanism of 
the protocol. Each mobile station updates their respective NAV value when they 
receive frames from other nodes. The NAV value indicates to the station the 
amount of time the medium is reserved; the station must wait until its NAV value 
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reaches nil before the station tries to access the medium. This feature is used 
primarily in the RTS/CTS handshake for medium reservation by mobile stations. 
An attacker can send a RTS frame with an exceptionally high value in the 
duration value field. The destination station is mandated to respond with a CTS 
frame with the duration value updated to account for time elapsed during the 
RTS/CTS exchange. Other mobile stations, upon receiving the CTS frame will 
update their respective NAV with the exceptionally large duration value. This 
causes these stations to defer their access to the medium by a much long period 
than necessary. The maximum duration value that is allowable under the IEEE 
802.11 protocol is 32767, which roughly translates to about 32 milliseconds. A 
major advantage of this form of attack is that the attacker can direct the RTS 
frame to a station that has high output power. The high output power station is 
able to propagate the CTS response frame to a wider area, and thus increases 
the probability that more mobile stations can be affected by the attack. An 





























IV. SIMULATION MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. OMNET++ ENVIRONMENT 
OMNeT++ is the acronym for Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++. 
It is an object-oriented modular discrete event simulator [6]. The simulator can be 
used for:  
• Communication protocols modeling 
• Computer networks modeling (traffic modeling etc.) 
• Modeling multi-processors and distributed systems 
• Modeling any other system where the discrete event approach is 
suitable. 
An OMNeT++ model comprises of hierarchically nested modules. There is 
no limit to the depth of module nesting. This facilitates the implementation of the 
logical structure of complex systems, which often entails many levels of 
abstraction.  Figure 10 illustrates the nomenclature of the hierarchy module 
nesting in OMNeT++. The hierarchically modules are constructed using a 
graphical interface called the Graphical Network Description (GNED) editor. This 
graphical tool allows users to have an overview of the logical implementation of 
the model; including the communication channels between the modules and the 
hierarchical relationship between modules. This visualization tool reduces the 
learning curve for OMNeT++, and allows users to build models quickly and 
accurately. 
 




B. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The IEEE 802.11 model is implemented using OMNeT++ in the Microsoft 
Visual C++ environment. The model comprise of only the MAC layer 
implementation, the physical layer is not explicitly modeled as the effects of the 
different transmission times due to different mediums can be simulated by using 
different timing values in the MAC layer. The model comprises of an AP, a 
medium module, an attacker module, and one or more mobile stations, as 
defined by the user. Figure provides a snap shot of the implemented model on 
the graphical display of OMNeT++. In this instance, there are 4 mobile stations. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Screen Shot of Implemented Model 
 
Although OMNeT++ is a discrete event simulator, a clock drive approach 
was preferred over an event driven approach for the IEEE 802.11 model. This is 
due to the need for mobile stations to listen to the network regularly to implement 
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the physical and virtual carrier sense mechanisms. A clock driven model would 
account for activities in every cycle and thus facilitates the accounting of NAV 
decrements and timeout triggers; e.g. DIFS timeout for medium reservation. 
 
C. KEY MAC FUNCTIONS 
The IEEE 802.11 MAC comprise of many functions and services 
necessary to ensure reliable communication. These services include security 
services, MSDU ordering, data services, distribution services, etc. The identity 
and media access vulnerabilities are localized in some of these services; as such 
the model does not implement all functionalities of the protocol. For the purpose 
of studying the effects of vulnerabilities, the following key functions are 
implemented: 
 
• Authentication, Association, Deauthentication and Disassociation 
Services 
• Virtual carrier sense mechanism 
• Distributed Coordination Function 
 
It was envisaged that the non-inclusion of the other functionalities of the 
protocol would have significant impact on the results of the simulation. This was 
because these additional functionalities are not affected by the attack strategies 
adopted; these functionalities do not interact with the spoofed frames generated 





























V. ATTACK STRATEGIES AND SIMULATION FINDINGS 
A. ATTACK GENERES 
An incremental approach was adopted in the simulation of attacks and 
defenses of the IEEE 802.11 model. An initial unprotected model is subjected 
three genres of attacks. Thereafter, the model is progressively hardened against 
each kind of attack, and the effectiveness of the defensive measures are 
evaluated. In order for all attacks to be effective, they must be repeated 
periodically; i.e. attacker station must periodically transmit the spoofed frame on 
the network.  
The cyclical period of transmitting spoof frames or conducting attacks is 
termed as the attack period. Alternatively the number of times a spoofed frame is 
transmitted or an attack is conducted over a 1 second time interval is termed as 
the attack cycle.  
The three genres of attacks under study are as follows:  
 
1. Deauthentication Attacks 
The management frames of the IEEE 802.11 protocol are not authenticate 
by the receiver, this allows an attack to spoof as a legitimate station in the 
network to send management frames to any other stations in the network. The 
attacker spoofs a mobile station to request to deauthenticate from the currently 
associated AP. The AP upon receiving the request must respond with a 
deauthentication frame with its destination as the spoofed mobile station (see 
Figure 8). The spoofed mobile station, after receiving the deauthentication frame 
from the AP, will set its authentication variable to false. This causes the victim 
mobile station to drop to state 1 of communication state with the AP (see Figure 
4).  
As the victim mobile station retains the desire to continue to communicate 
with the network, the victim mobile station will reinitiate the authentication and 
association with the same AP or another AP within range. In doing so, the victim 
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station needs obey all timing requirements of the DCF in order to access the 
medium to rejoin the network. The attacker needs to repeatedly spoof the victim 
mobile station in order to continuously deny the victim mobile station access to 
the network, or to degrade the station’s access rate. This form of attack affords 
the attacker with the ability to select a particular mobile station within the network 
for DoS attack. 
 
2. Disassociation Attacks 
This attack is very similar to the deauthentication attacks. Instead of 
requesting for deauthentication, the attacker requests disassociation from the 
currently associated AP, on behalf of the victim mobile station (see Figure 9). 
The victim mobile station, upon receiving the disassociation notification from the 
AP, will drop to state 2 of communication state with the AP (see Figure 4).  
The victim mobile station will attempt to reassociate with the same AP or 
another AP that may be within range. Similarly the attacker needs to repeatedly 
requests disassociation from the AP in order for this form of attack to be 
effective, and the attacker has the ability to direct the attack on a victim station of 
choice. 
 
3. RTS Attacks 
This attack exploits the implicit trust placed on the MAC address of 
stations participating in a RTS/CTS handshake for medium reservation. An 
attacker can spoof the request for reservation of the medium on behalf of a 
mobile station by sending an RTS frame with the duration value set to an 
arbitrary value. The AP, upon receiving the request, will respond with a CTS 
frame to all stations within its transmission range. The CTS frame’s duration 
value will be that of the initial value set in the RTS frame, less the time elapsed 
during the handshake. All stations receiving the CTS frame will update their 
respective NAV value, and will not attempt to access the medium until their NAV 
reaches zero (see Figure 12).  
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Figure 12.   RTS Attack 
 
The attacker can choose to set a high value in the duration field of the 
RTS frame, and thus denying other legitimate stations from assessing the 
medium for extended periods of time. This form of attack is non-discriminating as 
it affects all mobile stations within the AP transmission range, and it needs to be 
repeated periodically to sustain the denial of service or degradation effects. 
 
B. SIMULATION RESULTS OF ATTACK SCENARIOS 
All simulation scenarios are set up with 1 AP, 1 attacker station and 4 
mobiles stations as depicted in Figure 11. The scenarios are each configured 
with different combinations of attacker station with different attack strategies and 
mobile stations with various defense enhancements. 
 
1. Baseline Scenario 
The mobile stations are implemented as described by the IEEE 802.11 
protocol, without any additional protection enhancements to defend against 
attacks. The transmission rates of each of the 4 mobile stations over a 10 second 
time window are captured for analysis. Figure 13 and Table 1 captures the 
results from the simulation of the system in a benign environment. 
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The results from the simulation indicate healthy contention and access to 
the medium by all 4 mobile stations. This is inferred from the small differences of 
average data rates of all stations. 
 
Figure 13.   Simulation Results of Baseline Scenario 
 
  
Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 807.93 909.66 867.93 852.07
3 - 6 sec 831.67 909.33 813.33 855.33
6 - 10 sec 820.00 880.98 893.17 768.78
 
Table 1.   Average Values from Baseline Scenario 
 
 
2. Deauthentication Attack Scenario 
The attacker station is configured to carry out deauthentication attacks 
periodically over the 3rd to 6th second interval of the simulation. Attacker stations 




























this series of attacks, the chosen victim is Station 1. The attack cycle is varied to 
demonstrate its effects on the effectiveness of this attack strategy. 
Figure 14 and Table 2 captures the results of the simulation run with 
attack cycle set at 3333 frames/sec (attack period 300us). 




Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 951.72 788.62 877.59 791.72 
3 - 6 sec 902.00 319.67 944.67 838.67 
6 - 10 sec 900.98 757.80 799.27 858.54 
 
Table 2.   Average Value from Deauthentication Scenario (Attack Cycle  3333 
frames/sec) 
 
It was observed from the results of the simulation that the deauthentication 
































data rate of the victim station by about 60%. Although the victim station is still 
able to access the network, it suffers from the degradation effects of the attack.  
The attack cycle is increased to 3636 frames per second (attack period 
275us) during the attack interval from the 3rd second to 6th second of the 
simulation run. The victim station is Station 1. The results of the simulation are 
captured in Figure 15 and Table 3. 




Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 850.69 793.79 853.45 948.97 
3 - 6 sec 1066.67 20.33 1113.00 1098.67 
6 - 10 sec 761.22 853.17 820.00 868.05 
 





























It was observed from both Figure 15 and Table 3 that the victim station is 
almost totally denied from access to the network. Station 1 is only able to 
maintain a data rate of about 20 frames/sec during the period when the attacker 
station was conducting the attack. This victim station suffers a data rate 
degradation of about 97%. 
The attack cycle is further increased to 4000 attacks per second (attack 
period 250us) and the results are captured in Figure 16 and Table 4. 




Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 952.76 764.14 842.76 896.21 
3 - 6 sec 464.33 0.00 470.67 490.00 
6 - 10 sec 777.80 809.02 784.15 870.73 
 


































It was observed that the victim station was unable to transmit any data 
during the period when the attacker station was conducting the attack. It was also 
observed that other stations that are not the target of the attack, also suffered 
from a degradation of about 50% in data rate during the same period. This could 
be attributed to the aggressive effort by Station 1, in attempting to reauthenticate 
with the AP each time it is deauthenticate with the AP. The aggressive and 
frequent transmission of Authentication Request frames by Station 1 causes the 
other mobile stations to defer their access to the medium for data transmission. 
This results in an overall reduction of data rate by the stations that are not the 
target of the attack.  
 
3. Disassociation Attack Scenario 
This series of scenarios are similar to the Deauthentication attack 
simulation run, except that the attacker station was configured to carry out 
disassociation attacks. Station 1 is the target victim station for all disassociation 
attacks during the 3rd to 6th second interval of the simulation. 
A simulation run with disassociation attacks at 3636 frames/sec (attack 
period 275us) was conducted. The results of the simulation run are captured in 
Figure 17 and Table 5. 
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Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 778.97 899.31 926.21 830.34 
3 - 6 sec 1001.33 286.67 846.67 972.33 
6 - 10 sec 784.15 790.49 884.88 828.78 
 
Table 5.   Average Value from Disassociation Scenario (Attack Cycle 3636 
frames/sec) 
 
It was observed that the victim station’s data rate was reduced by about 
68% during the attack interval. Comparing this result with a deauthentication 
attack with the same attack cycle (Figure 15 and Table 3), where the victim 
station suffers a data rate degradation of about 97% due to the deauthentication 





























demonstrates the greater effectiveness of the deauthentication attack compared 
with the disassociation attack.  
The basis for the greater effectiveness of deauthentication attacks over 
disassociation attacks can be inferred from the communication state machine of 
mobile stations (see Figure 4). It is observed that a deauthentication attack 
triggers a two state change to the Communication State of the victim mobile 
station, as opposed to a one state change arising from a disassociation attack. 
The victim mobile station can only transmit data frames only when it is in State 3 
of the Communication State. As such, a deauthenticated victim station needs 
additional time and bandwidth to reestablish to State 3 before it can transmit data 
frames, as compared to a disassociated victim station. 
The attack cycle is increase to 5000 frames/sec (attack period 200us). 
The results are captured in Figure 18 and Table 6. 

































Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 812.76 926.55 911.72 802.07
3 - 6 sec 1036.00 27.33 1003.33 1107.33
6 - 10 sec 835.61 770.24 794.15 882.44
 
Table 6.   Average Value from Disassociation Scenario (Attack Cycle 5000 
frames/sec) 
 
Comparing the results in Figure 18, Table 6 and those of deauthentication 
attack with attack cycle of 3636 frames/sec (Figure 15, Table 3), both victim 
stations suffer about 97% degradation in data rate. However, the disassociation 
attack was conducted at a higher attack cycle at 5000 frames/second. This 
reinforces the conclusion that the deauthentication attack is superior than the 
disassociation attack in attaining the objectives of a DoS attack. 
 
4. RTS Attack Scenario 
For this series of simulations, the attacker station was configured to carry 
out RTS attacks periodically over the 3rd to 6th second interval of the simulation. 
The attacker station conducting the attacks does not have the ability to target and 
choose victim stations for this attack. This form of attack affects all mobile station 
within the transmission range of the attacker station or the AP that was unwittedly 
used to collaborate the attack.  Apart from the attack cycle that was varied, the 
duration field of the RTS frame was also varied to demonstrate its effects on the 
effectiveness of the RTS attack strategy. 
Figure 19 and Table 7 captures the results of the simulation run with 
attack cycle set at 2000 frames/sec (attack period 500us) and duration field set at 
310. 
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Figure 19.   Simulation Results of RTS Attack Scenario (Attack Cycle 2000 
frames/sec, Duration Field 310) 
 
 
Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 892.76 881.72 869.66 823.45
3 - 6 sec 176.00 106.67 137.33 77.33
6 - 10 sec 833.90 792.93 792.93 816.10
 
Table 7.   Average Value from RTS Attack Scenario (Attack Cycle 2000 frames/sec, 
Duration Field 310) 
Even though the attack cycle is much lower as compared with the 
deauthentication and disassociation cases, it was observed that all mobile 
stations suffered significant degradation in data rate. The degradation ranges 
from 80% (Station 0) to 91% (Station 3). Comparatively, the RTS is especially 
potent in denying network services to mobile stations. 
Another simulation run was conducted with the same attack cycle, but the 
valued in duration field of the RTS frame was increased to 350. The results are 




























Figure 20.   Simulation Results of RTS Attack Scenario (Attack Cycle 2000 
frames/sec, Duration Field 350) 
 
 
Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 810.00 859.31 876.21 871.03
3 - 6 sec 12.00 0.00 0.00 41.33
6 - 10 sec 833.66 795.12 770.73 824.88
 
Table 8.   Average Value from RTS Attack Scenario (Attack Cycle 2000 frames/sec, 
Duration Field 350) 
 
Form the results in Table 20, it was observed that by only increasing the 
value in the duration field of the RTS frame, all mobile stations can be effectively 
denied of network services. All mobile stations will back off from accessing the 
medium in accordance with the value in the duration field of a CTS frame that 
was in response to the spoofed RTS frame. When the value in the duration field 
is sufficiently high with respect to the attack period; in this case the attack period 




























time between each spoofed RTS frame, thus denying all other stations access to 
the medium. 
To validate this conclusion, a simulation run was conducted with attack 
cycle set at 1000 frames/sec (Attack period 1000us) and duration field value set 
at 850. The results of the simulation are captured in Figure 21 and Table 9. 
Figure 21.   Simulation Results of RTS Attack Scenario (Attack Cycle 1000 
frames/sec, Duration Field 850) 
 
 
Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 814.83 772.76 921.38 953.10
3 - 6 sec 0.00 30.00 25.67 0.00
6 - 10 sec 768.29 790.98 819.51 809.02
 
Table 9.   Average Values from RTS Attack Scenario (Attack Cycle 1000 
frames/sec, Duration Field 850) 
 
The attack cycle has been reduced by 50% from 2000 to 1000 frames/sec 



























and disassociation attacks, the attack cycle of RTS is not as critical in 
determining the success of the attack. So long as the value of the duration field in 
the spoofed RTS frame was sufficiently high, the RTS attack would be able to 
deny all mobile stations access to the medium. The only drawback about the 
RTS attack is that the attacker station cannot choose to direct the attack at any 
single mobile station, but to attack all stations within the transmission range of 
the innocent collaborating station. 
 
C. SIMULATION RESULTS OF DEFENSE SCENARIOS 
The series of proposed defenses against the discussed attack are non-
cryptographic countermeasures that can be implemented in the firmware of 
existing MAC hardware [3]. This has the advantages of hardening implemented 
IEEE 802.11-based WLANs, without having to make massive hardware 
replacements. 
 
1. Defense Against Deauthentication and Disassociation Attacks 
The deauthentication and disassociation vulnerability can be solved 
directly by explicitly authenticating IEEE 802.11 management frames, which are 
unencrypted at the moment. However, this measure will result in legacy MAC 
designs unable to meet the increased processing demands due to insufficient 
CPU capacity to implement this functionality as a software upgrade [3]. 
Therefore, solutions that are implemented at system-level with low overhead are 
preferred. In particular, by delaying the effects of deauthentication or 
disassociation frames, mobile stations has the opportunity to listen for 
subsequent frames from the AP before deciding to deauthenticate or 
disassociate from the AP. The mobile station can wait for a timeout period before 
obeying the deauthentication or disassociation frame. If before the timeout 
expires, the AP continues to communicate with the mobile station, the mobile 
station can disregard the received deauthentication or disassociation notification.  
This approach has the advantage that it can be implemented with a simple 
firmware modification to existing Network Interface Cards (NICs). 
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The mobile stations were enhanced with the timeout protection against 
spoofed deauthentication and disassociation frames. A simulation run was 
conducted with deauthentication attack cycle set at 4000 frames/sec and timeout 
value set at 500us. The results are illustrated in Figure 22 and Table 10. 
Figure 22.   Simulation Results of Defense Against Deauthentication Scenario (Attack 
Cycle 4000 frames/sec, Timeout 500us) 
 
 
Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 849.66 793.45 948.97 912.07
3 - 6 sec 1030.67 486.33 1070.67 1063.33
6 - 10 sec 857.32 833.17 808.78 803.41
 
Table 10.   Average Values From Defense Against Deauthentication Scenario (Attack 
Cycle 4000 frames/sec, Timeout 500us) 
 
Comparing the results of this simulation run and that of the 
deauthentication attack at same attack cycle rate of 4000 frame/sec, but without 




























hardened victim station suffers a data rate degradation of about 39%, this was 
still a significant improvement over the total denial of service in the unprotected 
situation. 
It was also observed that unlike the unprotected situation, the other mobile 
stations in the network are not affected by the attack. This is because there was 
no longer a need for the victim station to aggressively reauthenticate with the AP, 
and thus other mobile stations’ request to reserve the medium are not 
unnecessarily deferred due to the victim station’s reauthenticate request frames. 
The same defense enhancement was implemented against disassociation 
attacks. A simulation run was conducted with disassociation attacks at attack 
cycle of 5000 frames/sec and timeout at 500us. The results of the simulation are 
captured in Figure 23 and Table 11. 
 
Figure 23.   Simulation Results of Defense Against Disassociation Scenario (Attack 
































Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 884.83 852.07 867.59 866.90
3 - 6 sec 962.67 1017.67 946.00 913.00
6 - 10 sec 810.73 839.02 802.44 863.41
 
Table 11.   Average Values From Defense Against Disassociation Scenario (Attack 
Cycle 5000 frames/sec, Timeout 500us) 
 
Comparing the results of this simulation run with those of the 
disassociation attack at attack cycle of 5000 frame/sec without defenses (Figure 
18, Table 6), it was observed that the hardened victim station suffers no data rate 
degradation during the attack interval. The implemented defense was able to 
successfully defend against the disassociation attack at a rate that was 
previously successfully (97% data rate degradation). 
Another simulation run was conduct with the attacker station intensifying 
the disassociation attack. The attack cycle is increased to 6667 frames/sec 
(attack period 150us). The results from this simulation are captured in Figure 24 





























Figure 24.   Simulation Results of Defense Against Disassociation Scenario (Attack 
Cycle 6667 frames/sec, Timeout 500us) 
 
 
Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 856.21 827.24 929.31 884.14
3 - 6 sec 998.33 558.00 1035.67 1033.33
6 - 10 sec 833.90 818.54 839.02 827.80
 
Table 12.   Average Values From Defense Against Disassociation Scenario (Attack 
Cycle 6667 frames/sec, Timeout 500us) 
 
The result of the simulation shows that the victim station suffers a data 
rate degradation of about 33%. This shows that the attacker station can still 
achieve limited success with the disassociation strategy, but needs to be very 
aggressive in mounting the attack in order to achieve the limited success. The 
increased in effort of conducting an attack and reduction in payoff may provide 
deterrence to an attacker from deploying this attack strategy. 
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2. Defense Against RTS Attacks 
The virtual carrier-sense attack is much harder to defend against than the 
deauthentication, disassociation attack. This is mainly due to the problems of 
possible hidden nodes [5] in WLAN. Mobile stations may move in and out of an 
AP’s coverage area, and thus may not be able to listen to all parts of a legitimate 
medium reservation handshake. These incomplete handshakes may seem like 
the RTS attacks of a malicious station, thus it is difficult to discern between 
legitimate reservation requests or malicious attacks. 
One approach to mitigate the effects of an RTS attack is for mobile 
stations to monitor the state of communications in the WLAN. If there are 
deviations from the frame sequence or timing sequence as prescribe by the IEEE 
802.11 protocol, mobile stations can take preventive measures to deny malicious 
attacks from succeeding in denial of network services. In the case of RTS 
attacks, mobile stations will continue to monitor the medium for a timeout period 
after a CTS frame has been received. The timeout period must take into 
consideration the expected response times of legitimate medium reservation and 
data transmission sequences (see Figure 7). If the expected response is not 
received after the timeout has expired, it could be due to the hidden node 
problem or the previous CTS frame could have been part of an attack on the 
network. Either case, the mobile station can ignore the previous medium 
reservation and commence to contend for medium access. If the previous 
medium reservation was legitimate, a collision will ensure, causing the mobile 
stations to backoff for a random period before trying again to reserve the medium 
for data transmission. If the previous medium reservation request was an attack 
conducted by a malicious station, the mobile stations can safely contend for the 
medium upon expiry of timeout, without the possibility of a collision  
A simulation run was conducted with the attacker station conducting an 
RTS attack with attack cycle at 2000 frames/sec and duration field value at 350. 
The mobile stations are implemented with the described defenses, with the 
timeout value set at 1 DIFS (128us). The results of the simulation are captured in 
Figure 25 and Table 13. 
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Figure 25.   Simulation Results of Defense Against RTS Attack Scenario (Attack Cycle 
2000 frames/sec, Duration Field 350, Timeout 128us) 
 
Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 528.28 638.97 777.24 914.48
3 - 6 sec 319.67 334.67 346.00 353.00
6 - 10 sec 495.37 599.76 717.32 863.90
 
Table 13.   Average Values From Defense Against RTS Attack Scenario (Attack 
Cycle 2000 frames/sec, Duration Field 350, Timeout 128us) 
 
It was observed from the results of the simulation that the defense 
enhancements made to the mobile stations achieved limited success in 
mitigating the effects of an RTS attacks. The mobile stations suffer from 
degradation to data rates ranging from 39% (Station 1) to 61% (Station 3). The 
degradation in the data rates is attribute to the excess wait time (1 DIFS) 
necessary to determine that the medium is free, before commencing to contend 































for an unprotected system (Figure 20, Table 8), the degradation suffered by the 
protected system may still be acceptable for users of the WLAN. 
Another simulation was conducted with the attacker station set up with 
attack cycle of 1000 frames/sec and duration field value set at 850. The mobile 
stations’ timeout value remained at 1 DIFS. The results of this simulation are 
illustrated in Figure 26 and Table 14. 
 
Figure 26.   Simulation Results of Defense Against RTS Attack Scenario (Attack Cycle 
1000 frames/sec, Duration Field 850, Timeout 128us) 
 
 
Simulation Time Average Data Rate (Frames / sec) 
 Station 0 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 
0 - 3 sec 504.83 635.86 777.24 914.48
3 - 6 sec 444.33 512.67 616.00 712.00
6 - 10 sec 493.41 599.27 723.17 874.63
 
Table 14.   Average Values From Defense Against RTS Attack Scenario (Attack 































Analyzing the results from the simulation, it was expected that the 
implement defense against RTS attacks performed better when the attack is less 
aggressive; 50% reduction in attack cycle rate. The data rate degradation 
suffered by the mobile station ranges from 12% to 22%, as compared to the 
previous simulation case of 39% to 61%, and almost total denial of service in the 
unprotected system. As such, the implemented defense can be an effective 
deterrent to potential attackers as the attack effort must be aggressive enough to 
achieve the desired level of data rate degradation to mobile stations. 
However, more sophisticated attackers can outsmart this defense 
enhancement by simply mimicking as two legitimate stations (1 AP and 1 mobile 
station) exchanging medium access handshake and data transmissions. This will 
deceive the legitimate mobile station into backing off from accessing the medium, 
until such a time the attacker station decides to stop the spoofed exchange. 
 
D. SUMMARY OF EFFECTIVENESS OF IMPLEMENTED DEFENSES 
It was observed that different attack genres have different effects on the 
data rate of the victim mobile station. The results from the series of simulation 
runs are tabulated in Table 15. 
 







Deauthentication Attacks 4000 100% 39% 
Disassociation Attacks 5000 97% 0% 
RTS Attacks 2000 100% 50% 
 
Table 15.   Consolidated Data Rate Degradation 
 
From the table, it was observed that the hardened systems were able to 
resist all three kinds of attacks to different degrees, as compared to the 
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unprotected systems, where there was almost total denial of service to the victim 
stations.  
Although the hardened mobile systems were able to resist the attacks, it 
was also shown in the simulation runs that by increasing the aggressiveness of 
the attacks, the attacker could still achieve success in limiting the victim station’s 
data rate. However, it is hope that the higher demands placed on the attacker to 
mount the attack on hardened mobile stations, coupled with the reduced payoff 
of the attack, will discourage an attacker from deploying the 3 genres of attacks. 
The series of proposed defenses against the discussed attack were 
conceived such that they can be implemented in the firmware of existing MAC 
hardware. This has the advantages of hardening implemented IEEE 802.11-
based WLANs, without having to make massive hardware replacements. The 
benefits of the ability to limit the success of attacks and the need for only 
firmware upgrades to implement the proposed solutions are worthwhile for the 
proposed solutions to be considered, not as a permanent solution, but as interim 
measures taken to discourage attackers from exploiting the known weaknesses. 
The long-term objective must still be to eliminate implicit trust IEEE 802.11 
networks place in a transmitting station’s address, and to implement appropriate 
per-packet authentication mechanisms such that trust among the nodes of a 








WLANs based on the IEEE 802.11 protocol have been widely deployed in 
many areas. This is mainly due to the physical conveniences of wireless mobile 
communications. However, there are some vulnerabilities that exist in the IEEE 
802.11 protocol that make the implement WLANs susceptible to attacks that 
target the confidentiality of data and denial of network services. This work 
focused on those vulnerabilities that can be exploited to mount DoS attacks on 
specific victim stations or to conduct network wide DoS attacks. 
The two categories of vulnerabilities of the IEEE 802.11 protocol; identity 
vulnerabilities and medium access vulnerabilities can be exploited to conduct 
attacks that deauthenticate or disassociate mobile station from the network, or to 
indefinitely reserve the medium such that legitimate mobile stations cannot 
access the medium. These attack strategies have the common objective of 
denying the victim mobile stations access to the network. 
In response to the 3 genres of attacks, specific countermeasures are 
discussed and simulated to evaluate their effectiveness against the attacks. The 
results from the simulation runs demonstrated that these countermeasures do 
indeed result in increased resistance against the attacks. The benefits of the 
proposed countermeasures are that they can be implemented only with firmware 
upgrades, and thus eliminating the need for massive replacement of existing 
network hardware. 
However, the fundamental problem of implicit trust IEEE 802.11 networks 
place in a transmitting station’s address remains. Therefore the long-term plan 






























APPENDIX A. SOURCE CODE LIST OF SIMULATION MODEL 
//------------------------------------------------------------ 
// File: Dyna.ned 
// 
//  OMNeT++ simulation of IEEE802 network 
//  
//  Nicholas Tan, 01 September 2003 






// Access Point -- 
// 
// An Access Point (AP) of the Wireless LAN 
// 
simple AccessPoint // 
    parameters:  
    gates:  
        out: out;  




// Freespace -- 
// 
// The wireless transmission medium of the network 
// 
simple Freespace // 
    parameters:  
    gates:  
        out: out[];  
        in: in[];  
        out: APout;  
        in: APin;  
        out: Aout;  




// Station -- 
// 
// the Mobile station (STA) of the wireless network 
// 
simple Station // 
    gates:  
        out: out;  
        in: in;  




//Hacker attacking the network 
simple Attacker // 
    gates:  
        in: in;  





// Model of the IEEE802 wireless network, consisting of serveral mobile stations, an access point 
// 
module IEEE802 // 
    parameters:  
52 
        num_station : numeric const;  
    submodules:  
        ap: AccessPoint; // 
            parameters:  
            display: "p=164,110;i=access_point02;b=80,75"; 
        freespace: Freespace; // 
            parameters:  
            gatesizes:  
                in[num_station],  
                out[num_station];  
            display: "p=245,199;i=cloud_l;b=103,49"; 
        sta: Station[num_station]; // 
            parameters:  
            display: "p=106,317,r,50;i=pda1;b=25,36"; 
        attacker: Attacker;  
            display: "p=440,150;i=hacker05;b=139,105"; 
        clk: Clock[num_station];  
            display: "p=78,340,r,50;i=cogwheel2_s;b=15,10"; 
    connections:  
        for i=0..num_station-1 do  
            sta[i].out --> datarate 11000000 --> freespace.in[i]; // 
            freespace.out[i] --> sta[i].in; // 
            clk[i].out --> sta[i].Cin;  
        endfor;  
        ap.out --> datarate 11000000 --> freespace.APin; // 
        freespace.APout --> ap.in; // 
        freespace.Aout --> attacker.in display "m=m,95,63,47,28"; // 
        attacker.out --> datarate 11000000 --> freespace.Ain display "m=m,47,28,95,63"; // 
                                                                                         




simple Clock  
    gates:  
            




// Instantiates an IEEE 802 wireless network. 
// 
network theWirelessLAN : IEEE802  
    parameters:  






// file: ap.ccp 





class AccessPoint : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(AccessPoint,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 




    //recording variables 
 cOutVector resp_v("DataStn"); 
 
 
 float process_time = 0; 
 float time_stamp = 0; 
 float elasped_time = 0; 
 float delay = 0; 
 
    int random_wait; // variance time randomised 
  
 //Address Information 
 int sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); 
 int AP_addr = sta_add + 1; 
 const int data_addr = 99; //permanent addr for data sta 
 
   //msg parameters 
   int source; // msg source 
   int destination; // msg destination 
   int msg_kind; //msg kind 
   long msg_nav; // nav of the msg 




   //IEEE802 vectors 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
 
   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
 
   //Flags 
 
   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false;// Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false;// Another Station has CTS outstanding 




   //Timing Constants - dependant on the PHY 
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
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  const int Device_Itvl = 3; // 3 cycles of clock 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128; // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28; // microsecond 
  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
   
 
 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 









 //receiving from FS 
 cMessage *done = receive(); 
 source = done->scr_add(); 
 destination = done->des_add(); 
 msg_kind = done->kind(); 
 msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
 msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
 
 delete done; 
 
 
if (destination == AP_addr) 
{//if destination 
 
 if (msg_kind == AUT) 
 {//if AUT 
  
         //reply with a rply_AUT 
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "rply_AUT" ); 
   work->setSCR(AP_addr); 
   work->setDES(source); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(source); 
   work->setKind(rply_AUT); 
   work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
   work->setNAV(0); 
    
   random_wait = intrand(6); 
   wait ((SIFS+random_wait)*Million); 
    
   send( work, "out" ); 
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 }//if AUT 
 
  
 if(msg_kind == ASS) 
 {//if ASS 
    
   //reply with a rply_ASS 
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "rply_ASS" ); 
   work->setSCR(AP_addr); 
   work->setDES(source); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(source); 
   work->setKind(rply_ASS); 
   work->setNAV(0); 
   work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
    
   random_wait = intrand(6); 
   wait ((SIFS+random_wait)*Million); 
 
   send( work, "out" ); 
 
 }//if ASS 
 
  
 if((msg_kind == RTS)) 
 {//if RTS reply with CTS 
    
   //reply with a CTS 
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "CTS" ); 
   work->setSCR(AP_addr); 
   work->setDES(source); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(source); 
   work->setKind(CTS); 
       
   work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
 
   // The transmission delay from RTS to CTS needs to be subtracted 
   // from the RTS NAV 
    
   process_time = msg_nav - SIFS; 
    
   work->setNAV(process_time); 
    
   NAV = process_time; //setting own NAV vector 
   time_stamp = simTime(); //of the NAV vector 
 
   wait ((SIFS)*Million); 
 
   send( work, "out" ); 
    
    
 }//if RTS 
 
 
 if(msg_kind == LASTPKT) 
 {//if DATA 
    
   //reply with a ACK for last packet 
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "ACK" ); 
   work->setSCR(AP_addr); 
   work->setDES(source); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(source); 
   work->setKind(ACK); 
   work->setNAV(0); 
    
   wait ((SIFS)*Million);//delay SIFS 
   work->setTimestamp(); 
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   send( work, "out" ); 
   //resp_v.record(source); //xxx 
    










// file: clock.ccp 





class Clock : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(Clock,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 






 //Addressing Information  
  int sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); //total num of station 
 int AP_addr = sta_add + 1; //permanent AP address 
 int Attk_addr = sta_add + 2; // permanent addr for attacker 
 int Clk_addr = sta_add + 3; // permanet addr for clock 
 const int data_addr = 99; //permanent addr for data sta 
  
 
    
   //IEEE802 vectors 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
 
   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
 
   //Flags 
 
   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false;// Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false;// Another Station has CTS outstanding 




   //Timing Constants - dependant on the PHY 
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
  const int Device_Itvl = 3; // 3 cycles of clock 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128; // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28; // microsecond 
  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
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 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 




    




   for(;;) 
    {  
 
   
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "clock" ); 
   work->setSCR(Clk_addr); 
   work->setDES(Clk_addr); 
   work->setKind(CLK);//clock signal 
   work->setNAV(0); 
   wait (delay); 
   send( work, "out" ); 
  





// file: freespace.ccp 





class Freespace : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(Freespace,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 




   
  // address of all stations 
  int sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); // Total num of STA 
  int AP_addr = sta_add + 1; // permanent addr for AP 
  int Attk_addr = sta_add + 2; // permanent addr for attacker 
 
 
  // msg parameters 
  int source; // source MAC address of the rx msg 
  int msg_kind; //type of msg 
  long msg_nav; // nav of msg 
  float msg_timestamp; //timestamp of msg 
  //float process_time; 
   
   
   
  int loop_count; 
 
   //IEEE802 vectors 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
 
   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
 
   //Flags 
 
   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false;// Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false;// Another Station has CTS outstanding 




   //Timing Constants - dependant on the PHY 
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
  const int Device_Itvl = 3; // 3 cycles of clock 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128; // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28; // microsecond 
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  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
   
 
 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 




   
   
for(;;) 
    {  
 
 
  //receiving one packet 
  cMessage *pkt = receive(); 
 
  source = pkt->scr_add(); 
  msg_kind = pkt->kind(); 
  msg_nav = pkt->nvec(); 
  msg_timestamp = pkt->msgtimer(); 
   
   
   
   // rebro packet 
 
  if (source > sta_add) // either AP or Attacker packet 
   
  { // AP or Attk 
 
   //broadcast to all STA 
   for(loop_count=0; loop_count < sta_add; loop_count++)  
      
   {//for 
    int dest = loop_count; 
    cMessage *work = (cMessage *) pkt->dup(); //duplicate orginal pkt 
    work->setNAV(msg_nav); //omnet bug, need to explicite include this 
    work->setMsgTime(msg_timestamp); 
          send( work, "out", dest); 
 
   }//for 
 
   if (source == AP_addr) 
 
   {//AP packet 
   // send to Attk 
      cMessage *work3 = new cMessage( *pkt ); //duplicate orginal pkt 
   work3->setNAV(msg_nav); //omnet bug, need to explicite include this 
   work3->setMsgTime(msg_timestamp); 
   send( work3, "Aout" ); 
   
   }// AP packet 
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   else 
 
   {//Attk packet 
   // send to AP 
      cMessage *work2 = new cMessage( *pkt ); //duplicate orginal pkt 
   work2->setNAV(msg_nav); //omnet bug, need to explicite include this 
   work2->setMsgTime(msg_timestamp); 
   send( work2, "APout" ); 
    
   } 
  } // AP or Attk 
   
  else 
 
  {//else 
 
   // send to AP 
      cMessage *work4 = (cMessage *) pkt->dup(); //duplicate orginal pkt 
   work4->setNAV(msg_nav); //omnet bug, need to explicite include this 
   work4->setMsgTime(msg_timestamp); 
   send( work4, "APout" ); 
   
  
   // send to Attaker 
      cMessage *work5 = new cMessage( *pkt ); //duplicate orginal pkt 
   work5->setNAV(msg_nav); //omnet bug, need to explicite include this 
   work5->setMsgTime(msg_timestamp); 
   send( work5, "Aout" ); 
   
   // broadcast to all other STA 
 
   for(loop_count=0; loop_count < sta_add; loop_count++)  
      
   {//for 
    int dest = loop_count; 
    if (loop_count != source) 
    {//if 
    cMessage *work = new cMessage( *pkt ); 
    work->setNAV(msg_nav); //omnet bug, need to explicite include this 
    work->setMsgTime(msg_timestamp); 
    send( work, "out", dest); 
     
    }//if 
   }//for 
 
 
  }//else 
 
 delete pkt; 
 
 







// file: sta(unprotected).ccp 






class Station : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(Station,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 





 float process_time = 0; // working variable for internal calculations 
 float time_stamp = 0;  // time stamp of NAV 
 float elasped_time = 0; // working variable for internal calculations 
 float tx_time = 0;  // Time between successive packet transmissions 
 float tx_stamp = 0;  // Time stamp of packet sent, used in conjunction with 
tx_time 
 int  delay_len = 0;  // working variable for internal calculations 
 int  delay_counter = 0;  // working variable for internal calculations 
 int  true_counter = 0; 
 int  packet_count = 0; 
 int  delay_RTS;   // random back off SIFS for RTS frame 
 int  delay_CTS;   // delay for CTS tx 
 int  data_len = 120;  // arbitual data transmission time 
 time_t current_time;  // stores current pc clock time in seconds 




 //recording variables 
 cOutVector resp_v("DataStation"); // time when data is transmitted 
 cOutVector resp_b("Tx times");  // time between successive transmissions 
 
 //Addressing Information  
 int  own_addr = gate( "out" )->toGate()->index(); //sta own address 
  int  sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); //total num of station 
 int  AP_addr = sta_add + 1;      
 //permanent AP address 
 int  Attk_addr = sta_add + 2;     
 //permanent addr for attacker 
 const int data_addr = 99;       
 //permanent addr for data sta 
 
 //data parameters 
 const int data_length = 8000; //1000 bytes (xxx Need to check on this one) 
 
   //msg parameters 
   int  source;   // msg source 
   int  destination; // msg destination 
   int  msg_kind;  //msg kind 
   long  msg_nav;  // nav of the msg 
   float msg_timestamp; // time stamp of msg 
 
    
   //IEEE802 vectors 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; //initial state 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
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   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
 
   //Flags 
 
   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false; // Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false; // Another Station has CTS outstanding 
   bool flag_CLK = false; // not waiting for CLK signal 




   //Timing Constants - dependant on the PHY 
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
  int Device_Itvl; // device delay 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128;  // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28;  // microsecond 
  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4;  // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
   
 
 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 







//randomly generate device interval for each cycle 
current_time = time(NULL); 
srand(current_time+own_addr); 
divresult = ldiv (current_time,31);//the max possible RNG for intuniform is 31 
Device_Itvl = intuniform(4, 7, divresult.rem); 
 
//-----------------Incoming Pkt ------------------------- 
   
   
//receiving from FS 
cMessage *done = receive(); 
source = done->scr_add(); 
destination = done->des_add(); 
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msg_kind = done->kind(); 
msg_nav = done->nvec(); 





if (msg_kind == CLK) 
{//if clock signal 
 
 if (NAV > 0) 
 {//if NAV >0 
 NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
 if (NAV <=0) NAV = 0; 




 time_stamp = simTime(); 
  




//---------------PACKETs addressed to this station---------------- 
if (destination == own_addr) 
 {// if destination 
 
 
//------------------Authentication & Association------------------ 
 if ((msg_kind == rply_AUT) && (flag_AUT)) {State =2;flag_AUT = false; flag_ASS = false;} 
 if ((msg_kind == rply_ASS) && (flag_ASS)) {State =3;flag_ASS = false;} 
 if (msg_kind == de_AUT) {State =1; flag_AUT = false;flag_ASS = false;} 




   
 if ((msg_kind == CTS) && (State == 3) && (flag_RTS)) 
 {//if CTS 
    
  //----NAV Calculuation--------------- 
  NAV = msg_nav; //set the NAV to that specified in CTS 
     
  flag_CTS = true; //CTS has been approved for this station 
  flag_DataSent = false; //no need to send last packet, only need if the first packets are sent 
   
 
  //delay 1 SIFS and listen out for other Transmitions 
  //if there is any transmission during the SIFS 
  //the CTS will be aborted (flag_CTS set to false) 
  flag_CLK = false; 
  delay_counter = 1; 
  delay_CTS = (SIFS / CLOCK)  + intrand(error_SIFS/CLOCK); //DIFS + x number of clock 
cycle 
   
  while (delay_counter <= delay_CTS)// SIFS + x number of clock cycle 
   {//receiving from CLK 
   cMessage *done = receive(); 
   destination = done->des_add(); 
   msg_kind = done->kind(); 
   msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
   delete done; 
   if (msg_kind != CLK)  
    {//if 
    if (msg_kind == RTS) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
RTS 
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    if (msg_kind == CTS) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
CTS 
    if (msg_kind == DATA) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
DATA 
    if ((msg_kind == de_AUT) && (destination == own_addr)) {flag_CTS = 
false; flag_RTS = false;delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10);State =1;flag_AUT = false;flag_ASS = false;} 
    if ((msg_kind == de_ASS) && (State ==3) && (destination == 
own_addr)){ flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10);flag_AUT = false;flag_ASS = 
false;State =2;} 
    }//if 
   if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; delay_counter++;if (NAV <= 0) NAV 
= 0;}  
   }//receiving from CLK 
 
 
  //no station has tx during the SIFS 
  //this station will tx data 
  while (flag_CTS) 
   {//send out data packets 
    
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Data" ); 
   work->setSCR(own_addr); 
   work->setDES(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
   work->setKind(DATA); 
   work->setNAV(0); 
   work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
   send( work, "out"); 
   
    
   //wait for 1 clock cycle 
   flag_CLK = false; 
   while (!flag_CLK) 
    {//receiving from CLK 
    cMessage *done = receive(); 
    msg_kind = done->kind(); 
    delete done; 
    if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; flag_CLK = true;} 
    if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 
    }//receiving from CLK 
       
       
   if (NAV <= CLOCK) {flag_CTS = false;flag_DataSent = true;} //completed 
sending all data less last packet 
 
   }//send out data packets 
 
   if (flag_DataSent) 
   {//flag_DataSent 
    //send Last packet  
    cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Last Pkt" ); 
    work->setSCR(own_addr); 
    work->setDES(AP_addr); 
    //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
    //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
    work->setKind(LASTPKT); 
    work->setNAV(0); 
    work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
    send( work, "out"); 
    
  
    //recording vectors 
    packet_count++; 
    resp_v.record(packet_count); //xxx 
    
    tx_time = simTime() - tx_stamp; 
    //resp_b.record(tx_time);//xxx 
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    tx_stamp = simTime(); 
 
   }//flag_DataSent 
 




 //------ACK received--------------- 
 if ((msg_kind == ACK) && (flag_RTS)) 
 {flag_RTS = false;} //no more outstanding RTS 
 
  //delay of 1 cycle to allow other stations access to media 
  flag_CLK = false; 
  while (!flag_CLK) 
  {//receiving from CLK 
  cMessage *done = receive(); 
  msg_kind = done->kind(); 
  delete done; 
  if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; flag_CLK = true;}  
  if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 









//--------------------PACKETs addressed to other station-------------------- 
  
 {//not to this destination 
 
 
 // other station has asked for RTS and own has not sent RTS 
 if ((msg_kind == RTS) && (!flag_RTS)) 
  {//if RTS  
  if (msg_nav > NAV) 
   {//if msg_NAV 
   NAV = msg_nav; 
   time_stamp = simTime(); 
   }//if msg_NAV 
  flag_ORTS = true; // another Station has RTS 
  flag_RTS = false; // back off 
   
  }//if RTS 
 
 
 // other station has asked for RTS, own has sent RTS 
 if ((msg_kind == RTS) && (flag_RTS)) 
  {//if RTS 
  if (msg_nav > NAV) 
   {//if msg_NAV 
   NAV = msg_nav; 
   time_stamp = simTime(); 
   }//if msg_NAV 
  flag_ORTS = true; // another Station has RTS 
  flag_RTS = false; // back off 
   











//----------State 1 Authentication------------ 
 
  if ((State ==1) && (flag_AUT == false)) 
   
  {//if State ==1 
  //request for Authentication to AP 
  cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Auth" ); 
  work->setSCR(own_addr); 
  work->setDES(AP_addr); 
  //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
  //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
  work->setKind(AUT); 
  work->setNAV(0); 
  work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
  NAV = 0; 
  time_stamp = simTime(); 
  send( work, "out"); 
  flag_AUT = true;  //oustanding AUT request 
  }//if State ==1 
 
 
//----------State 2 Association------------ 
 
  if ((State ==2) && (flag_ASS == false)) 
  {//if State ==2 
  //request for Authentication to AP 
  cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Assoc" ); 
  work->setSCR(own_addr); 
  work->setDES(AP_addr); 
  //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
  //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
  work->setKind(ASS); 
  work->setNAV(0); 
  work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
  send( work, "out"); 
  flag_ASS = true;  //oustanding ASS request 
  time_stamp = simTime(); 





//----------State 3 Authenticated and Associated------------ 
 
 
  if (State ==3) 
  {//if State == 3 
    
   if ((NAV == 0) && (!flag_RTS)) 
   {//Send RTS 
    
   //RTS 
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "RTS" ); 
   work->setSCR(own_addr); 
   work->setDES(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
   work->setKind(RTS); 
   work->setNAV(data_len); 
   process_time = simTime(); 
   work->setMsgTime(process_time); 
 
    
   flag_ORTS = false;//reset this flag 
 
   //Delay for DIFS 
   delay_counter = 1; // reset counter 
     
 
   //random number gen  
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   delay_len = intuniform(1, Device_Itvl, divresult.rem); 
    
   delay_RTS = (DIFS / CLOCK)  + delay_len; //DIFS + x number of clock cycle 
    
   while (delay_counter <= delay_RTS)// DIFS + x number of SIFS 
   {//while delay 
    cMessage *done = receive(); 
    destination = done->des_add(); 
    msg_kind = done->kind(); 
    msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
    delete done; 
    //Clock Cycle received 
    if (msg_kind == CLK)  
     { 
     if (NAV == 0) delay_counter++; //only increment if NAV = 0 
     NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
     flag_ORTS = false; 
     if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 
     } 
    else 
     {//else 
     //if during any of the DIFS cycles is not a clock signal, then 
check if it is an RTS, CTS, DeAut, DeASS 
     if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav;//set to the higher NAV 
     if (msg_kind == RTS) {flag_ORTS = true; delay_counter = 
0;} //back off 
     if (msg_kind == CTS) {flag_ORTS = true; delay_counter = 
0;} //back off 
     if ((msg_kind == de_AUT) && (destination == own_addr)) 
{State =1; flag_AUT = false;flag_ASS = false;delay_counter = (delay_RTS + 10);} 
     if ((msg_kind == de_ASS) && (State ==3) && (destination == 
own_addr)){ State =2;;flag_AUT = false;flag_ASS = false;delay_counter = (delay_RTS + 10);} 
     }//else 
    
     
   }//while delay 
 
 
   if (State == 3) //send RTS only if the station is at state 3 only 
   {//if State 3 
    //NAV Calculations for own RTS 
    NAV = data_len; 
    time_stamp = simTime(); 
    
    //Send the RTS message 
    send( work, "out");  
    flag_RTS = true; 
   }//if State 3 
 
   }// Send RTS 
 










// file: attacker.ccp 





class Attacker : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(Attacker,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 





 int random_wait; // variance time randomised 
 double process_time = 0; 
 double time_stamp = 0; 
 double elasped_time = 0; 
 
  
 int data_len = 1000; // arbitual data transmission time 
 
  
 //Addressing Information  
 int own_addr = gate( "out" )->toGate()->index(); // sta own address 
  int sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); //total num of station 
 int AP_addr = sta_add + 1; //permanent AP address 
 int Attk_addr = sta_add + 2; // permanent addr for attacker 
 const int data_addr = 99; //permanent addr for data sta 
 
 //data parameters 
 const int data_length = 8000; //1000 bytes (xxx Need to check on this one) 
 
   //msg parameters 
   int source; // msg source 
   int destination; // msg destination 
   int msg_kind; //msg kind 
   int data_size; //length of data or 
   long msg_nav; // nav of the msg 
   float msg_timestamp; // time stamp of msg    
    
   //IEEE802 vectors 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
 
   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
 
   //Flags 
 
   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false;// Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false;// Another Station has CTS outstanding 





   //Timing Constants - dependant on the PHY 
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
  const int Device_Itvl = 3; // 3 cycles of clock 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128; // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28; // microsecond 
  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
   
 
 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 





 //clock cycle 
 float delay = (CLOCK * Million); 
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    
 






 //receiving from FS 
 cMessage *done = receive(); 












// file: attacker-DeAUT.cpp 





class Attacker : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(Attacker,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 





 int random_wait; // variance time randomised 
 double process_time = 0; 
 double time_stamp = 0; 
 double elasped_time = 0; 
 
  
 int data_len = 1000; // arbitual data transmission time 
 
  
 //Addressing Information  
 int own_addr = gate( "out" )->toGate()->index(); // sta own address 
  int sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); //total num of station 
 int AP_addr = sta_add + 1; //permanent AP address 
 int Attk_addr = sta_add + 2; // permanent addr for attacker 
 const int data_addr = 99; //permanent addr for data sta 
 
 //data parameters 
 const int data_length = 8000; //1000 bytes (xxx Need to check on this one) 
 
   //msg parameters 
   int source; // msg source 
   int destination; // msg destination 
   int msg_kind; //msg kind 
   int data_size; //length of data or 
   long msg_nav; // nav of the msg 
   float msg_timestamp; // time stamp of msg 
 
    
 
    //Attacker Parameters 
   //-------------------- 
 
 bool flag_wait = false; 
 const int Starttime = 3; 
 int period = 3; 




   //IEEE802 vectors 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
 
   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
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   //Flags 
 
   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false;// Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false;// Another Station has CTS outstanding 




   //Timing Constants - dependant on the PHY 
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
  const int Device_Itvl = 3; // 3 cycles of clock 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128; // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28; // microsecond 
  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
   
 
 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 





 //clock cycle 
 float delay = (CLOCK * Million); 
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    
 






 //conduct attack from Starttime to Endtime 
 
 if (!flag_wait) 
 {wait (Starttime); flag_wait = true;} 
 
 
 if (simTime() < Endtime) 
 { 
















 {cMessage *done = receive(); 













// file: attacker-DeAss.cpp 





class Attacker : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(Attacker,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 





 int random_wait; // variance time randomised 
 double process_time = 0; 
 double time_stamp = 0; 
 double elasped_time = 0; 
 
  
 int data_len = 1000; // arbitual data transmission time 
 
  
 //Addressing Information  
 int own_addr = gate( "out" )->toGate()->index(); // sta own address 
  int sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); //total num of station 
 int AP_addr = sta_add + 1; //permanent AP address 
 int Attk_addr = sta_add + 2; // permanent addr for attacker 
 const int data_addr = 99; //permanent addr for data sta 
 
 //data parameters 
 const int data_length = 8000; //1000 bytes (xxx Need to check on this one) 
 
   //msg parameters 
   int source; // msg source 
   int destination; // msg destination 
   int msg_kind; //msg kind 
   int data_size; //length of data or 
   long msg_nav; // nav of the msg 
   float msg_timestamp; // time stamp of msg 
 
 
   //Attacker Parameters 
   //-------------------- 
 
 bool flag_wait = false; 
 const int Starttime = 3; 
 int period = 3; 
 int Endtime = Starttime + period; 
 
    
   //IEEE802 vectors 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
 
   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
 
   //Flags 
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   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false;// Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false;// Another Station has CTS outstanding 




   //Timing Constants - dependant on the PHY 
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
  const int Device_Itvl = 3; // 3 cycles of clock 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128; // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28; // microsecond 
  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
   
 
 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 





 //clock cycle 
 float delay = (CLOCK * Million); 
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    
 








  //conduct attack from Starttime to Endtime 
 
 if (!flag_wait) 
 {wait (Starttime); flag_wait = true;} 
 
 
 if (simTime() < Endtime) 
 { 




 //DeAss Stn 1 













 {cMessage *done = receive(); 











// file: attacker-RTS.cpp 





class Attacker : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(Attacker,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 





 int random_wait; // variance time randomised 
 double process_time = 0; 
 double time_stamp = 0; 
 double elasped_time = 0; 
 
  
 int data_len = 1000; // arbitual data transmission time 
 
  
 //Addressing Information  
 int own_addr = gate( "out" )->toGate()->index(); // sta own address 
  int sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); //total num of station 
 int AP_addr = sta_add + 1; //permanent AP address 
 int Attk_addr = sta_add + 2; // permanent addr for attacker 
 const int data_addr = 99; //permanent addr for data sta 
 
 //data parameters 
 const int data_length = 8000; //1000 bytes (xxx Need to check on this one) 
 
   //msg parameters 
   int source; // msg source 
   int destination; // msg destination 
   int msg_kind; //msg kind 
   int data_size; //length of data or 
   long msg_nav; // nav of the msg 
   float msg_timestamp; // time stamp of msg  
 
 
 //Attacker Parameters 
   //-------------------- 
 
 bool flag_wait = false; 
 int Starttime = 3; 




    
   //IEEE802 vectors 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
 
   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
 
   //Flags 
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   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false;// Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false;// Another Station has CTS outstanding 




   //Timing Constants - dependant on the PHY 
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
  const int Device_Itvl = 3; // 3 cycles of clock 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128; // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28; // microsecond 
  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4; // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
   
 
 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 





 //clock cycle 
 float delay = (CLOCK * Million); 
 //------------------------------------------------------------------------- 









 //conduct attack from Starttime to Endtime 
 
 if (!flag_wait) 
 {wait (Starttime); flag_wait = true;} 
 
 
 if (simTime() < Endtime) 
 { 
 wait (0.002000); 
 
 //RTS Attack 
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 send( work, "out"); 
 




 {cMessage *done = receive(); 









// file: sta-DeAut.ccp 






class Station : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(Station,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 





 float process_time = 0; // working variable for internal calculations 
 float time_stamp = 0;  // time stamp of NAV 
 float elasped_time = 0; // working variable for internal calculations 
 float tx_time = 0;  // Time between successive packet transmissions 
 float tx_stamp = 0;  // Time stamp of packet sent, used in conjunction with 
tx_time 
 int  delay_len = 0;  // working variable for internal calculations 
 int  delay_counter = 0;  // working variable for internal calculations 
 int  true_counter = 0; 
 int  packet_count = 0; 
 int  delay_RTS;   // random back off SIFS for RTS frame 
 int  delay_CTS;   // delay for CTS tx 
 int  data_len = 120;  // arbitual data transmission time 
 time_t current_time;  // stores current pc clock time in seconds 




 //recording variables 
 cOutVector resp_v("DataStation"); // time when data is transmitted 
 cOutVector resp_b("Tx times");  // time between successive transmissions 
 
 //Addressing Information  
 int  own_addr = gate( "out" )->toGate()->index(); //sta own address 
  int  sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); //total num of station 
 int  AP_addr = sta_add + 1;      
 //permanent AP address 
 int  Attk_addr = sta_add + 2;     
 //permanent addr for attacker 
 const int data_addr = 99;       
 //permanent addr for data sta 
 
 //data parameters 
 const int data_length = 8000; //1000 bytes (xxx Need to check on this one) 
 
   //msg parameters 
   int  source;   // msg source 
   int  destination; // msg destination 
   int  msg_kind;  //msg kind 
   long  msg_nav;  // nav of the msg 
   float msg_timestamp; // time stamp of msg 
 
    
   //IEEE802 vectors 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; //initial state 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
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   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
 
   //Flags 
 
   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false; // Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false; // Another Station has CTS outstanding 
   bool flag_CLK = false; // not waiting for CLK signal 
   bool flag_DataSent;  // Data flag to indicate if there is a need to send the last packet 




   //Timing Constants - dependant on the PHY 
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
  int Device_Itvl; // device delay 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128;  // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28;  // microsecond 
  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
 
  //DeAUT, DeASS delay timeout 
  const int TimeOut = 500; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4;  // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
   
 
 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 












//randomly generate device interval for each cycle 
current_time = time(NULL); 
srand(current_time+own_addr); 
divresult = ldiv (current_time,31);//the max possible RNG for intuniform is 31 
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//-----------------Incoming Pkt ------------------------- 
   
   
//receiving from FS 
cMessage *done = receive(); 
source = done->scr_add(); 
destination = done->des_add(); 
msg_kind = done->kind(); 
msg_nav = done->nvec(); 






if (msg_kind == CLK) 
{//if clock signal 
 
 if (NAV > 0) 
 {//if NAV >0 
 NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
 if (NAV <=0) NAV = 0; 




 time_stamp = simTime(); 
  




//---------------PACKETs addressed to this station---------------- 
if (destination == own_addr) 
 {// if destination 
 
 
//------------------Authentication & Association------------------ 
 if ((msg_kind == rply_AUT) && (flag_AUT)) {State =2;flag_AUT = false; flag_ASS = false;} 
 if ((msg_kind == rply_ASS) && (flag_ASS)) {State =3;flag_ASS = false;} 
  
 if (msg_kind == de_AUT)  
   
 {//if de_AUT (apply TimeOut and flag_DeAUT) 
  //initialise 
  delay_counter = TimeOut; 
  flag_DeAUT = false; 
   
  //sense the media to check for AP packets 
  while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeAUT)) 
 
  {//while 
 
   cMessage *done = receive(); 
   source = done->scr_add(); 
   destination = done->des_add(); 
   msg_kind = done->kind(); 
   msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
   msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
   delete done; 
 
   //---Clock--- 
   if (msg_kind == CLK) 
   { 
   delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
   NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
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   if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
   } 
  
   //---Check AP--- 
   if (source == AP_addr)  
    { 
    flag_DeAUT = true; 
    if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
    } 
 
  }//while 
   
  //---Successful de_AUT--- 
  if (!flag_DeAUT) 
  {   
  State =1; 
  flag_AUT = false; 
  flag_ASS = false; 
  } 
 
  //zerolise all parameters 
  msg_kind = 0; 
 
 








   
 if ((msg_kind == CTS) && (State == 3) && (flag_RTS)) 
 {//if CTS 
    
  //----NAV Calculuation--------------- 
  NAV = msg_nav; //set the NAV to that specified in CTS 
     
  flag_CTS = true; //CTS has been approved for this station 
  flag_DataSent = false; //no need to send last packet, only need if the first packets are sent 
   
 
  //delay 1 SIFS and listen out for other Transmitions 
  //if there is any transmission during the SIFS 
  //the CTS will be aborted (flag_CTS set to false) 
  flag_CLK = false; 
  delay_counter = 1; 
  delay_CTS = (SIFS / CLOCK)  + intrand(error_SIFS/CLOCK); //DIFS + x number of clock 
cycle 
   
  while (delay_counter <= delay_CTS)// SIFS + x number of clock cycle 
   {//while receiving from CLK 
   cMessage *done = receive(); 
   destination = done->des_add(); 
   msg_kind = done->kind(); 
   msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
   delete done; 
   if (msg_kind != CLK)  
    {//if 
    if (msg_kind == RTS) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
RTS 
    if (msg_kind == CTS) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
CTS 
    if (msg_kind == DATA) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
DATA 
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    if ((msg_kind == de_AUT) && (destination == own_addr))  
     {//if de_AUT (apply TimeOut and flag_DeAUT) 
     //initialise 
     delay_counter = TimeOut; 
     flag_DeAUT = false; 
   
     //sense the media to check for AP packets 
     while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeAUT)) 
 
     {//while 
 
     cMessage *done = receive(); 
     source = done->scr_add(); 
     destination = done->des_add(); 
     msg_kind = done->kind(); 
     msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
     msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
     delete done; 
 
     //---Clock--- 
     if (msg_kind == CLK) 
     { 
     delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
     NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
     if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
     } 
  
     //---Check AP--- 
     if (source == AP_addr)  
     { 
     flag_DeAUT = true; 
     if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
     } 
 
     }//while 
   
    //---Successful de_AUT--- 
    if (!flag_DeAUT) 
    {   
    flag_RTS = false; 
    State =1; 
    flag_AUT = false; 
    flag_ASS = false; 
    } 
 
    //zerolise all parameters 
    msg_kind = 0; 
    flag_CTS = false; 
    delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); 
 
    }//if de_AUT 
     
 




    if ((msg_kind == de_ASS) && (State ==3) && (destination == 
own_addr)){ flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10);flag_AUT = false;flag_ASS = 
false;State =2;} 
    }//if 
   if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; delay_counter++;if (NAV <= 0) NAV 
= 0;}  




  //no station has tx during the SIFS 
  //this station will tx data 
  while (flag_CTS) 
   {//send out data packets 
    
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Data" ); 
   work->setSCR(own_addr); 
   work->setDES(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
   work->setKind(DATA); 
   work->setNAV(0); 
   work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
   send( work, "out"); 
   
    
   //wait for 1 clock cycle 
   flag_CLK = false; 
   while (!flag_CLK) 
    {//receiving from CLK 
    cMessage *done = receive(); 
    msg_kind = done->kind(); 
    delete done; 
    if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; flag_CLK = true;} 
    if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 
    }//receiving from CLK 
       
   if (NAV <= CLOCK) {flag_CTS = false;flag_DataSent = true;} //completed 
sending all data less last packet 
 
   }//send out data packets 
 
   if (flag_DataSent) 
   {//flag_DataSent 
    //send Last packet  
    cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Last Pkt" ); 
    work->setSCR(own_addr); 
    work->setDES(AP_addr); 
    //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
    //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
    work->setKind(LASTPKT); 
    work->setNAV(0); 
    work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
    send( work, "out"); 
    
  
    //recording vectors 
    packet_count++; 
    resp_v.record(packet_count); //xxx 
    
    tx_time = simTime() - tx_stamp; 
    //resp_b.record(tx_time);//xxx 
    tx_stamp = simTime(); 
 
   }//flag_DataSent 
 




 //------ACK received--------------- 
 if ((msg_kind == ACK) && (flag_RTS)) 
 {flag_RTS = false;} //no more outstanding RTS 
 
  //delay of 1 cycle to allow other stations access to media 
  flag_CLK = false; 
  while (!flag_CLK) 
  {//receiving from CLK 
  cMessage *done = receive(); 
  msg_kind = done->kind(); 
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  delete done; 
  if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; flag_CLK = true;}  
  if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 









//--------------------PACKETs addressed to other station-------------------- 
  
 {//not to this destination 
 
 
 // other station has asked for RTS and own has not sent RTS 
 if ((msg_kind == RTS) && (!flag_RTS)) 
  {//if RTS  
  if (msg_nav > NAV) 
   {//if msg_NAV 
   NAV = msg_nav; 
   time_stamp = simTime(); 
   }//if msg_NAV 
  flag_ORTS = true; // another Station has RTS 
  flag_RTS = false; // back off 
   
  }//if RTS 
 
 
 // other station has asked for RTS, own has sent RTS 
 if ((msg_kind == RTS) && (flag_RTS)) 
  {//if RTS 
  if (msg_nav > NAV) 
   {//if msg_NAV 
   NAV = msg_nav; 
   time_stamp = simTime(); 
   }//if msg_NAV 
  flag_ORTS = true; // another Station has RTS 
  flag_RTS = false; // back off 










//----------State 1 Authentication------------ 
 
  if ((State ==1) && (flag_AUT == false)) 
   
  {//if State ==1 
  //request for Authentication to AP 
  cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Auth" ); 
  work->setSCR(own_addr); 
  work->setDES(AP_addr); 
  //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
  //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
  work->setKind(AUT); 
  work->setNAV(0); 
  work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
  NAV = 0; 
  time_stamp = simTime(); 
  send( work, "out"); 
  flag_AUT = true;  //oustanding AUT request 




//----------State 2 Association------------ 
 
  if ((State ==2) && (flag_ASS == false)) 
  {//if State ==2 
  //request for Authentication to AP 
  cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Assoc" ); 
  work->setSCR(own_addr); 
  work->setDES(AP_addr); 
  //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
  //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
  work->setKind(ASS); 
  work->setNAV(0); 
  work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
  send( work, "out"); 
  flag_ASS = true;  //oustanding ASS request 
  time_stamp = simTime(); 





//----------State 3 Authenticated and Associated------------ 
 
 
  if (State ==3) 
  {//if State == 3 
    
   if ((NAV == 0) && (!flag_RTS)) 
   {//Send RTS 
    
   //RTS 
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "RTS" ); 
   work->setSCR(own_addr); 
   work->setDES(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
   work->setKind(RTS); 
   work->setNAV(data_len); 
   process_time = simTime(); 
   work->setMsgTime(process_time); 
 
    
   flag_ORTS = false;//reset this flag 
 
   //Delay for DIFS 
   delay_counter = 1; // reset counter 
     
 
   //random number gen  
   delay_len = intuniform(1, Device_Itvl, divresult.rem); 
    
   delay_RTS = (DIFS / CLOCK)  + delay_len; //DIFS + x number of clock cycle 
    
   while (delay_counter <= delay_RTS)// DIFS + x number of SIFS 
   {//while delay 
    cMessage *done = receive(); 
    destination = done->des_add(); 
    msg_kind = done->kind(); 
    msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
    delete done; 
    //Clock Cycle received 
    if (msg_kind == CLK)  
     { 
     if (NAV == 0) delay_counter++; //only increment if NAV = 0 
     NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
     flag_ORTS = false; 
     if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 
     } 
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    else 
     {//else 
     //if during any of the DIFS cycles is not a clock signal, then 
check if it is an RTS, CTS, DeAut, DeASS 
     if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav;//set to the higher NAV 
     if (msg_kind == RTS) {flag_ORTS = true; delay_counter = 
0;} //back off 
     if (msg_kind == CTS) {flag_ORTS = true; delay_counter = 
0;} //back off 
      
      
     if ((msg_kind == de_AUT) && (destination == own_addr))  
       {//if de_AUT (apply TimeOut and 
flag_DeAUT) 
       //initialise 
       delay_counter = TimeOut; 
       flag_DeAUT = false; 
   
       //sense the media to check for AP 
packets 
       while ((delay_counter > 0) && 
(!flag_DeAUT)) 
 
       {//while 
 
        cMessage *done = receive(); 
        source = done->scr_add(); 
        destination = done-
>des_add(); 
        msg_kind = done->kind(); 
        msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
        msg_timestamp = done-
>msgtimer(); 
        delete done; 
 
        //---Clock--- 
        if (msg_kind == CLK) 
        { 
        delay_counter = 
delay_counter - CLOCK; 
        NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
        if (delay_counter < 0) 
delay_counter = 0; 
        } 
  
        //---Check AP--- 
        if (source == AP_addr)  
        { 
         flag_DeAUT = true; 
         if (msg_nav > NAV) 
NAV = msg_nav; 
        } 
 
       }//while 
   
       //---Successful de_AUT--- 
       if (!flag_DeAUT) 
       {   
       State =1; 
       flag_AUT = false; 
       flag_ASS = false; 
      
       } 
 
       //zerolise all parameters 
       msg_kind = 0; 
       delay_counter = (delay_RTS + 10); 
 
      }//if de_AUT 
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     if ((msg_kind == de_ASS) && (State ==3) && (destination == 
own_addr)){ State =2;flag_AUT = false;flag_ASS = false;delay_counter = (delay_RTS + 10);} 
     }//else 
    
   }//while delay 
 
 
   if ((State == 3) && (NAV <=0)) //send RTS only if the station is at state 3 only 
   {//if State 3 
    //NAV Calculations for own RTS 
    NAV = data_len; 
    time_stamp = simTime(); 
    
    //Send the RTS message 
    send( work, "out");  
    flag_RTS = true; 
   }//if State 3 
 
   }// Send RTS 
 
 











// file: sta-DeASS.ccp 






class Station : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(Station,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 





 float process_time = 0; // working variable for internal calculations 
 float time_stamp = 0;  // time stamp of NAV 
 float elasped_time = 0; // working variable for internal calculations 
 float tx_time = 0;  // Time between successive packet transmissions 
 float tx_stamp = 0;  // Time stamp of packet sent, used in conjunction with 
tx_time 
 int  delay_len = 0;  // working variable for internal calculations 
 int  delay_counter = 0;  // working variable for internal calculations 
 int  true_counter = 0; 
 int  packet_count = 0; 
 int  delay_RTS;   // random back off SIFS for RTS frame 
 int  delay_CTS;   // delay for CTS tx 
 int  data_len = 120;  // arbitual data transmission time 
 time_t current_time;  // stores current pc clock time in seconds 




 //recording variables 
 cOutVector resp_v("DataStation"); // time when data is transmitted 
 cOutVector resp_b("Tx times");  // time between successive transmissions 
 
 //Addressing Information  
 int  own_addr = gate( "out" )->toGate()->index(); //sta own address 
  int  sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); //total num of station 
 int  AP_addr = sta_add + 1;      
 //permanent AP address 
 int  Attk_addr = sta_add + 2;     
 //permanent addr for attacker 
 const int data_addr = 99;       
 //permanent addr for data sta 
 
 //data parameters 
 const int data_length = 8000; //1000 bytes (xxx Need to check on this one) 
 
   //msg parameters 
   int  source;   // msg source 
   int  destination; // msg destination 
   int  msg_kind;  //msg kind 
   long  msg_nav;  // nav of the msg 
   float msg_timestamp; // time stamp of msg 
 
    
   //IEEE802 vectors 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; //initial state 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
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   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
 
   //Flags 
 
   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false; // Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false; // Another Station has CTS outstanding 
   bool flag_CLK = false; // not waiting for CLK signal 
   bool flag_DataSent;  // Data flag to indicate if there is a need to send the last packet 
   bool flag_DeAUT = false; // Indicate that a DeAUT is valid 




   //Timing Constants - dependant on the PHY 
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
  int Device_Itvl; // device delay 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128;  // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28;  // microsecond 
  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
 
  //DeAUT, DeASS delay timeout 
  const int TimeOut = 500; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4;  // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
   
 
 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 












//randomly generate device interval for each cycle 
current_time = time(NULL); 
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srand(current_time+own_addr); 
divresult = ldiv (current_time,31);//the max possible RNG for intuniform is 31 




//-----------------Incoming Pkt ------------------------- 
   
   
//receiving from FS 
cMessage *done = receive(); 
source = done->scr_add(); 
destination = done->des_add(); 
msg_kind = done->kind(); 
msg_nav = done->nvec(); 






if (msg_kind == CLK) 
{//if clock signal 
 
 if (NAV > 0) 
 {//if NAV >0 
 NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
 if (NAV <=0) NAV = 0; 
 }//if NAV >0 
 
 time_stamp = simTime(); 
  




//---------------PACKETs addressed to this station---------------- 
if (destination == own_addr) 
 {// if destination 
 
 
//------------------Authentication & Association------------------ 
 if ((msg_kind == rply_AUT) && (flag_AUT)) {State =2;flag_AUT = false; flag_ASS = false;} 
 if ((msg_kind == rply_ASS) && (flag_ASS)) {State =3;flag_ASS = false;} 
  
  
//------------------DeAuth & DeAss Handler------------------ 
 //--------------DeAuth-------------------- 
 if (msg_kind == de_AUT)  
   
 {//if de_AUT (apply TimeOut and flag_DeAUT) 
  //initialise 
  delay_counter = TimeOut; 
  flag_DeAUT = false; 
   
  //sense the media to check for AP packets 
  while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeAUT)) 
 
  {//while 
 
   cMessage *done = receive(); 
   source = done->scr_add(); 
   destination = done->des_add(); 
   msg_kind = done->kind(); 
   msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
   msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
   delete done; 
 
   //---Clock--- 
   if (msg_kind == CLK) 
93 
   { 
   delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
   NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
   if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
   } 
  
   //---Check AP--- 
   if (source == AP_addr)  
    { 
    flag_DeAUT = true; 
    if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
    } 
 
  }//while 
   
  //---Successful de_AUT--- 
  if (!flag_DeAUT) 
  {   
  State =1; 
  flag_AUT = false; 
  flag_ASS = false; 
  } 
 
  //zerolise all parameters 
  msg_kind = 0; 
 
 




 if ((msg_kind == de_ASS) && (State ==3))  
   
 {//if de_ASS (apply TimeOut and flag_DeASS) 
  //initialise 
  delay_counter = TimeOut; 
  flag_DeASS = false; 
   
  //sense the media to check for AP packets 
  while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeASS)) 
 
  {//while 
 
   cMessage *done = receive(); 
   source = done->scr_add(); 
   destination = done->des_add(); 
   msg_kind = done->kind(); 
   msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
   msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
   delete done; 
 
   //---Clock--- 
   if (msg_kind == CLK) 
   { 
   delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
   NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
   if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
   } 
  
   //---Check AP--- 
   if (source == AP_addr)  
    { 
    flag_DeASS = true; 
    if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
    } 
 
  }//while 
   
  //---Successful de_ASS--- 
  if (!flag_DeASS) 
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  {   
  State =2; 
  flag_AUT = false; 
  flag_ASS = false; 
  } 
 
  //zerolise all parameters 
  msg_kind = 0; 
 
 
 }//if de_ASS 




   
 if ((msg_kind == CTS) && (State == 3) && (flag_RTS)) 
 {//if CTS 
    
  //----NAV Calculuation--------------- 
  NAV = msg_nav; //set the NAV to that specified in CTS 
     
  flag_CTS = true; //CTS has been approved for this station 
  flag_DataSent = false; //no need to send last packet, only need if the first packets are sent 
   
 
  //delay 1 SIFS and listen out for other Transmitions 
  //if there is any transmission during the SIFS 
  //the CTS will be aborted (flag_CTS set to false) 
  flag_CLK = false; 
  delay_counter = 1; 
  delay_CTS = (SIFS / CLOCK)  + intrand(error_SIFS/CLOCK); //DIFS + x number of clock 
cycle 
   
  while (delay_counter <= delay_CTS)// SIFS + x number of clock cycle 
   {//while receiving from CLK 
   cMessage *done = receive(); 
   destination = done->des_add(); 
   msg_kind = done->kind(); 
   msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
   delete done; 
   if (msg_kind != CLK)  
    {//if NOT CLOCK 
    if (msg_kind == RTS) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
RTS 
    if (msg_kind == CTS) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
CTS 
    if (msg_kind == DATA) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
DATA 
     
     
     
     
    //------------DeAUT Handler------------- 
    if ((msg_kind == de_AUT) && (destination == own_addr))  
     {//if de_AUT (apply TimeOut and flag_DeAUT) 
     //initialise 
     delay_counter = TimeOut; 
     flag_DeAUT = false; 
   
     //sense the media to check for AP packets 
     while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeAUT)) 
 
     {//while 
 
     cMessage *done = receive(); 
     source = done->scr_add(); 
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     destination = done->des_add(); 
     msg_kind = done->kind(); 
     msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
     msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
     delete done; 
 
     //---Clock--- 
     if (msg_kind == CLK) 
     { 
     delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
     NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
     if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
     } 
  
     //---Check AP--- 
     if (source == AP_addr)  
     { 
     flag_DeAUT = true; 
     if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
     } 
 
     }//while 
   
    //---Successful de_AUT--- 
    if (!flag_DeAUT) 
    {   
    flag_RTS = false; 
    State =1; 
    flag_AUT = false; 
    flag_ASS = false; 
    } 
 
    //zerolise all parameters 
    msg_kind = 0; 
    flag_CTS = false; 
    delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); 
 
    }//if de_AUT 
     
 
     
 
 
    //--------------DeASS Handler--------------- 
    if ((msg_kind == de_ASS) && (State ==3) && (destination == 
own_addr)) 
     {//if de_ASS (apply TimeOut and flag_DeASS) 
     //initialise 
     delay_counter = TimeOut; 
     flag_DeASS = false; 
      
     //sense the media to check for AP packets 
     while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeASS)) 
 
     {//while 
 
      cMessage *done = receive(); 
      source = done->scr_add(); 
      destination = done->des_add(); 
      msg_kind = done->kind(); 
      msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
      msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
      delete done; 
 
      //---Clock--- 
      if (msg_kind == CLK) 
      { 
      delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
      NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
      if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
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      } 
  
      //---Check AP--- 
      if (source == AP_addr)  
       { 
       flag_DeASS = true; 
       if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
       } 
 
     }//while 
   
     //---Successful de_ASS--- 
     if (!flag_DeASS) 
     {   
     State =2; 
     flag_AUT = false; 
     flag_ASS = false; 
     flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;delay_counter = 
(delay_CTS + 10); 
     } 
 
     //zerolise all parameters 
     msg_kind = 0; 
 
 
    }//if de_ASS 
 
   }//if NOT CLOCK 
 
    
    
   if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; delay_counter++;if (NAV <= 0) NAV 
= 0;}  
   }//while receiving from CLK 
 
 
  //no station has tx during the SIFS 
  //this station will tx data 
  while (flag_CTS) 
   {//send out data packets 
    
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Data" ); 
   work->setSCR(own_addr); 
   work->setDES(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
   work->setKind(DATA); 
   work->setNAV(0); 
   work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
   send( work, "out"); 
   
    
   //wait for 1 clock cycle 
   flag_CLK = false; 
   while (!flag_CLK) 
    {//receiving from CLK 
    cMessage *done = receive(); 
    msg_kind = done->kind(); 
    delete done; 
    if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; flag_CLK = true;} 
    if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 
    }//receiving from CLK 
       
   if (NAV <= CLOCK) {flag_CTS = false;flag_DataSent = true;} //completed 
sending all data less last packet 
 
   }//send out data packets 
 
   if (flag_DataSent) 
   {//flag_DataSent 
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    //send Last packet  
    cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Last Pkt" ); 
    work->setSCR(own_addr); 
    work->setDES(AP_addr); 
    //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
    //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
    work->setKind(LASTPKT); 
    work->setNAV(0); 
    work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
    send( work, "out"); 
    
  
    //recording vectors 
    packet_count++; 
    resp_v.record(packet_count); //xxx 
    
    tx_time = simTime() - tx_stamp; 
    //resp_b.record(tx_time);//xxx 
    tx_stamp = simTime(); 
 
   }//flag_DataSent 
 




 //------ACK received--------------- 
 if ((msg_kind == ACK) && (flag_RTS)) 
 {flag_RTS = false;} //no more outstanding RTS 
 
  //delay of 1 cycle to allow other stations access to media 
  flag_CLK = false; 
  while (!flag_CLK) 
  {//receiving from CLK 
  cMessage *done = receive(); 
  msg_kind = done->kind(); 
  delete done; 
  if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; flag_CLK = true;}  
  if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 









//--------------------PACKETs addressed to other station-------------------- 
  
 {//not to this destination 
 
 
 // other station has asked for RTS and own has not sent RTS 
 if ((msg_kind == RTS) && (!flag_RTS)) 
  {//if RTS  
  if (msg_nav > NAV) 
   {//if msg_NAV 
   NAV = msg_nav; 
   time_stamp = simTime(); 
   }//if msg_NAV 
  flag_ORTS = true; // another Station has RTS 
  flag_RTS = false; // back off 
  }//if RTS 
 
 
 // other station has asked for RTS, own has sent RTS 
 if ((msg_kind == RTS) && (flag_RTS)) 
  {//if RTS 
  if (msg_nav > NAV) 
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   {//if msg_NAV 
   NAV = msg_nav; 
   time_stamp = simTime(); 
   }//if msg_NAV 
  flag_ORTS = true; // another Station has RTS 
  flag_RTS = false; // back off 
  }//if RTS 
 
 




//----------State 1 Authentication------------ 
 
  if ((State ==1) && (flag_AUT == false)) 
   
  {//if State ==1 
  //request for Authentication to AP 
  cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Auth" ); 
  work->setSCR(own_addr); 
  work->setDES(AP_addr); 
  //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
  //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
  work->setKind(AUT); 
  work->setNAV(0); 
  work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
  NAV = 0; 
  time_stamp = simTime(); 
  send( work, "out"); 
  flag_AUT = true;  //oustanding AUT request 
  }//if State ==1 
 
 
//----------State 2 Association------------ 
 
  if ((State ==2) && (flag_ASS == false)) 
  {//if State ==2 
  //request for Authentication to AP 
  cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Assoc" ); 
  work->setSCR(own_addr); 
  work->setDES(AP_addr); 
  //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
  //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
  work->setKind(ASS); 
  work->setNAV(0); 
  work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
  send( work, "out"); 
  flag_ASS = true;  //oustanding ASS request 
  time_stamp = simTime(); 





//----------State 3 Authenticated and Associated------------ 
 
 
  if (State ==3) 
  {//if State == 3 
    
   if ((NAV == 0) && (!flag_RTS)) 
   {//Send RTS 
    
   //RTS 
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "RTS" ); 
   work->setSCR(own_addr); 
   work->setDES(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
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   work->setKind(RTS); 
   work->setNAV(data_len); 
   process_time = simTime(); 
   work->setMsgTime(process_time); 
 
    
   flag_ORTS = false;//reset this flag 
 
   //Delay for DIFS 
   delay_counter = 1; // reset counter 
     
 
   //random number gen  
   delay_len = intuniform(1, Device_Itvl, divresult.rem); 
    
   delay_RTS = (DIFS / CLOCK)  + delay_len; //DIFS + x number of clock cycle 
    
   while (delay_counter <= delay_RTS)// DIFS + x number of SIFS 
   {//while delay 
    cMessage *done = receive(); 
    destination = done->des_add(); 
    msg_kind = done->kind(); 
    msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
    delete done; 
    //Clock Cycle received 
    if (msg_kind == CLK)  
     { 
     if (NAV == 0) delay_counter++; //only increment if NAV = 0 
     NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
     flag_ORTS = false; 
     if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 
     } 
    else 
     {//else 
     //if during any of the DIFS cycles is not a clock signal, then 
check if it is an RTS, CTS, DeAut, DeASS 
     if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav;//set to the higher NAV 
     if (msg_kind == RTS) {flag_ORTS = true; delay_counter = 
0;} //back off 
     if (msg_kind == CTS) {flag_ORTS = true; delay_counter = 
0;} //back off 
      
     //---------------DeAUT Handler----------------  
   
     if ((msg_kind == de_AUT) && (destination == own_addr))  
       {//if de_AUT (apply TimeOut and 
flag_DeAUT) 
       //initialise 
       delay_counter = TimeOut; 
       flag_DeAUT = false; 
   
       //sense the media to check for AP 
packets 
       while ((delay_counter > 0) && 
(!flag_DeAUT)) 
 
       {//while 
 
        cMessage *done = receive(); 
        source = done->scr_add(); 
        destination = done-
>des_add(); 
        msg_kind = done->kind(); 
        msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
        msg_timestamp = done-
>msgtimer(); 
        delete done; 
 
        //---Clock--- 
        if (msg_kind == CLK) 
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        { 
        delay_counter = 
delay_counter - CLOCK; 
        NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
        if (delay_counter < 0) 
delay_counter = 0; 
        } 
  
        //---Check AP--- 
        if (source == AP_addr)  
        { 
         flag_DeAUT = true; 
         if (msg_nav > NAV) 
NAV = msg_nav; 
        } 
 
       }//while 
   
       //---Successful de_AUT--- 
       if (!flag_DeAUT) 
       {   
       State =1; 
       flag_AUT = false; 
       flag_ASS = false; 
      
       } 
 
       //zerolise all parameters 
       msg_kind = 0; 
       delay_counter = (delay_RTS + 10); 
 




     //--------------De ASS handler------------- 
     if ((msg_kind == de_ASS) && (State ==3) && (destination == 
own_addr)) 
          {//if 
de_ASS (apply TimeOut and flag_DeASS) 
     //initialise 
     delay_counter = TimeOut; 
     flag_DeASS = false; 
      
     //sense the media to check for AP packets 
     while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeASS)) 
 
     {//while 
 
      cMessage *done = receive(); 
      source = done->scr_add(); 
      destination = done->des_add(); 
      msg_kind = done->kind(); 
      msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
      msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
      delete done; 
 
      //---Clock--- 
      if (msg_kind == CLK) 
      { 
      delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
      NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
      if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
      } 
  
      //---Check AP--- 
      if (source == AP_addr)  
       { 
       flag_DeASS = true; 
       if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
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       } 
 
     }//while 
   
     //---Successful de_ASS--- 
     if (!flag_DeASS) 
     {   
     State =2; 
     flag_AUT = false; 
     flag_ASS = false; 
     delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); 
     } 
 
     //zerolise all parameters 
     msg_kind = 0; 
 
 
    }//if de_ASS 
 
     
     
     
    }//else xxx 
    
     
   }//while delay 
 
 
   if ((State == 3) && (NAV <=0)) //send RTS only if the station is at state 3 only 
   {//if State 3 
    //NAV Calculations for own RTS 
    NAV = data_len; 
    time_stamp = simTime(); 
    
    //Send the RTS message 
    send( work, "out");  
    flag_RTS = true; 
   }//if State 3 
 
   }// Send RTS 
 
 











// file: sta-protected.ccp 






class Station : public cSimpleModule 
{ 
    Module_Class_Members(Station,cSimpleModule,16384) 
    virtual void activity(); 
}; 
 





 float process_time = 0; // working variable for internal calculations 
 float time_stamp = 0;  // time stamp of NAV 
 float elasped_time = 0; // working variable for internal calculations 
 float tx_time = 0;  // Time between successive packet transmissions 
 float tx_stamp = 0;  // Time stamp of packet sent, used in conjunction with 
tx_time 
 int  delay_len = 0;  // working variable for internal calculations 
 int  delay_counter = 0;  // working variable for internal calculations 
 int  true_counter = 0; 
 int  packet_count = 0; 
 int  delay_RTS;   // random back off SIFS for RTS frame 
 int  delay_CTS;   // delay for CTS tx 
 int  counter_ORTS;  // counter when another Stn has asked for RTS 
 int  data_len = 120;  // arbitual data transmission time 
 time_t current_time;  // stores current pc clock time in seconds 




 //RECORDING VECTORS 
 cOutVector resp_v("DataStation"); // time when data is transmitted 
 cOutVector resp_b("Tx times");  // time between successive transmissions 
 
 //ADDRESSING INFORMATION  
 int  own_addr = gate( "out" )->toGate()->index(); //sta own address 
  int  sta_add = parentModule()->par("num_station"); //total num of station 
 int  AP_addr = sta_add + 1;      
 //permanent AP address 
 int  Attk_addr = sta_add + 2;     
 //permanent addr for attacker 
 const int data_addr = 99;       
 //permanent addr for data sta 
 
 //DATA PARAMETERS 
 const int data_length = 8000; //1000 bytes (xxx Need to check on this one) 
 
   //MSG PARAMETERS 
   int  source;   // msg source 
   int  destination; // msg destination 
   int  msg_kind;  //msg kind 
   long  msg_nav;  // nav of the msg 
   float msg_timestamp; // time stamp of msg 
 
    
   //IEEE802 VECTORS 
   //-------------------------- 
   //State definitions 
   int State = 1; //initial state 
   //1 - Unauthenticated, Unassociated 
   //2 - Authenticated, Unassociated 
   //3 - Authenticated, Associated 
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   //Network Allocation Vector (NAV) - max value 32767 (appox 32 msec) 
  
   long NAV = 0; 
   long temp_NAV = 0; // updated NAV value of the incoming packet 
 
   //Flags 
 
   bool flag_AUT = false; // is there an outstanding AUT request 
   bool flag_ASS = false; // is there an outstanding ASS request 
   bool flag_CTS = false; // This station has CTS 
   bool flag_RTS = false; // This station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_ORTS = false; // Another Station has RTS outstanding 
   bool flag_OCTS = false; // Another Station has CTS outstanding 
   bool flag_CLK = false; // not waiting for CLK signal 
   bool flag_DataSent;  // Data flag to indicate if there is a need to send the last packet 
   bool flag_DeAUT = false; // Indicate that a DeAUT is valid 




   //TIMING CONSTANTS - dependant on the PHY 
   
  //Device Interval - delays due to busy device 
  int Device_Itvl; // device delay 
 
  //DIFS 
  const int DIFS = 128;  // microsecond 
  const int error_DIFS = 12; // microsecond 
 
  //SIFS 
  const int SIFS = 28;  // microsecond 
  const int error_SIFS = 4; // microsecond 
 
 
  //DeAUT, DeASS delay timeout 
  const int TimeOut = 500; // microsecond 
 
  //ORTS delay 
  const int delay_ORTS = 128; // microsecond 
 
  //Clock Cycle Time 
  const int CLOCK = 4;  // microsecond 
 
  //microsecond denominator 
  const double Million = 0.000001; 
   
 
 // Message Kind Definition 
 const int RTS = 1; 
 const int CTS = 2; 
 const int AUT = 3; 
 const int ASS = 4; 
 const int rply_AUT = 5; 
 const int rply_ASS = 6; 
 const int de_AUT = 7; 
 const int de_ASS = 8; 
 const int DATA = 9; 
 const int ACK = 10; 
 const int CLK = 11; 













//randomly generate device interval for each cycle 
current_time = time(NULL); 
srand(current_time+own_addr); 
divresult = ldiv (current_time,31);//the max possible RNG for intuniform is 31 




//-----------------Incoming Pkt ------------------------- 
   
   
//receiving from FS 
cMessage *done = receive(); 
source = done->scr_add(); 
destination = done->des_add(); 
msg_kind = done->kind(); 
msg_nav = done->nvec(); 








if (msg_kind == CLK) 
{//if clock signal 
 
 if (NAV > 0) 
 {//if NAV >0 
 NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
 if (NAV <=0) NAV = 0; 
 }//if NAV >0 
 
 //Other Station has RTS handler 
 if (flag_ORTS)  
 {//ORTS 
  counter_ORTS = counter_ORTS + CLOCK; 
  if (counter_ORTS > delay_ORTS) {NAV = 0;flag_ORTS = false;} //no other transmission 




}//if clock signal 
 
 
//---------------PACKETs addressed to this station---------------- 
if (destination == own_addr) 
 {// if destination 
   
 
//------------------Authentication & Association------------------ 
 if ((msg_kind == rply_AUT) && (flag_AUT)) {State =2;flag_AUT = false; flag_ASS = false;} 
 if ((msg_kind == rply_ASS) && (flag_ASS)) {State =3;flag_ASS = false;} 
  
  
//------------------DeAuth & DeAss Handler------------------ 
 //--------------DeAuth-------------------- 
 if (msg_kind == de_AUT)  
   
 {//if de_AUT (apply TimeOut and flag_DeAUT) 
  //initialise 
  delay_counter = TimeOut; 
  flag_DeAUT = false; 
   
  //sense the media to check for AP packets 
  while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeAUT)) 
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  {//while 
 
   cMessage *done = receive(); 
   source = done->scr_add(); 
   destination = done->des_add(); 
   msg_kind = done->kind(); 
   msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
   msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
   delete done; 
 
   //---Clock--- 
   if (msg_kind == CLK) 
   { 
   delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
   NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
   if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
   } 
  
   //---Check AP--- 
   if (source == AP_addr)  
    { 
    flag_DeAUT = true; 
    if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
    } 
 
  }//while 
   
  //---Successful de_AUT--- 
  if (!flag_DeAUT) 
  {   
  State =1; 
  flag_AUT = false; 
  flag_ASS = false; 
  } 
 
  //zerolise all parameters 
  msg_kind = 0; 
 
 




 if ((msg_kind == de_ASS) && (State ==3))  
   
 {//if de_ASS (apply TimeOut and flag_DeASS) 
  //initialise 
  delay_counter = TimeOut; 
  flag_DeASS = false; 
   
  //sense the media to check for AP packets 
  while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeASS)) 
 
  {//while 
 
   cMessage *done = receive(); 
   source = done->scr_add(); 
   destination = done->des_add(); 
   msg_kind = done->kind(); 
   msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
   msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
   delete done; 
 
   //---Clock--- 
   if (msg_kind == CLK) 
   { 
   delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
   NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
   if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
   } 
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   //---Check AP--- 
   if (source == AP_addr)  
    { 
    flag_DeASS = true; 
    if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
    } 
 
  }//while 
   
  //---Successful de_ASS--- 
  if (!flag_DeASS) 
  {   
  State =2; 
  flag_AUT = false; 
  flag_ASS = false; 
  } 
 
  //zerolise all parameters 
  msg_kind = 0; 
 
 
 }//if de_ASS 




   
 if ((msg_kind == CTS) && (State == 3) && (flag_RTS)) 
 {//if CTS 
    
  //----NAV Calculuation--------------- 
  NAV = msg_nav; //set the NAV to that specified in CTS 
    
  flag_CTS = true; //CTS has been approved for this station 
  flag_DataSent = false; //no need to send last packet, only need if the first packets are sent 
   
 
  //delay 1 SIFS and listen out for other Transmitions 
  //if there is any transmission during the SIFS 
  //the CTS will be aborted (flag_CTS set to false) 
  flag_CLK = false; 
  delay_counter = 1; 
  delay_CTS = (SIFS / CLOCK)  + intrand(error_SIFS/CLOCK); //DIFS + x number of clock 
cycle 
   
  while (delay_counter <= delay_CTS)// SIFS + x number of clock cycle 
   {//while receiving from CLK 
   cMessage *done = receive(); 
   source = done->scr_add(); 
   destination = done->des_add(); 
   msg_kind = done->kind(); 
   msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
   delete done; 
   if (msg_kind != CLK)  
    {//if NOT CLOCK 
    if (msg_kind == RTS)  
    {//back off because someone else is transmitting RTS 
     flag_CTS = false;  
     flag_RTS = false; 
     NAV = msg_nav;  
     delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); 
     if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 
    }//back off because someone else is transmitting RTS 
 
    if (msg_kind == CTS) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
CTS 
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    if (msg_kind == DATA) {flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;NAV = 
msg_nav; delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0;}//back off because someone else is transmitting 
DATA 
     
     
     
     
    //------------DeAUT Handler------------- 
    if ((msg_kind == de_AUT) && (destination == own_addr))  
     {//if de_AUT (apply TimeOut and flag_DeAUT) 
     //initialise 
     delay_counter = TimeOut; 
     flag_DeAUT = false; 
   
     //sense the media to check for AP packets 
     while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeAUT)) 
 
     {//while 
 
     cMessage *done = receive(); 
     source = done->scr_add(); 
     destination = done->des_add(); 
     msg_kind = done->kind(); 
     msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
     msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
     delete done; 
 
     //---Clock--- 
     if (msg_kind == CLK) 
     { 
     delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
     NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
     if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
     } 
  
     //---Check AP--- 
     if (source == AP_addr)  
     { 
     flag_DeAUT = true; 
     if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
     } 
 
     }//while 
   
    //---Successful de_AUT--- 
    if (!flag_DeAUT) 
    {   
    flag_RTS = false; 
    State =1; 
    flag_AUT = false; 
    flag_ASS = false; 
    } 
 
    //zerolise all parameters 
    msg_kind = 0; 
    flag_CTS = false; 
    delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); 
 
    }//if de_AUT 
     
 
     
 
 
    //--------------DeASS Handler--------------- 
    if ((msg_kind == de_ASS) && (State ==3) && (destination == 
own_addr)) 
     {//if de_ASS (apply TimeOut and flag_DeASS) 
     //initialise 
     delay_counter = TimeOut; 
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     flag_DeASS = false; 
      
     //sense the media to check for AP packets 
     while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeASS)) 
 
     {//while 
 
      cMessage *done = receive(); 
      source = done->scr_add(); 
      destination = done->des_add(); 
      msg_kind = done->kind(); 
      msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
      msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
      delete done; 
 
      //---Clock--- 
      if (msg_kind == CLK) 
      { 
      delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
      NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
      if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
      } 
  
      //---Check AP--- 
      if (source == AP_addr)  
       { 
       flag_DeASS = true; 
       if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
       } 
 
     }//while 
   
     //---Successful de_ASS--- 
     if (!flag_DeASS) 
     {   
     State =2; 
     flag_AUT = false; 
     flag_ASS = false; 
     flag_CTS = false; flag_RTS = false;delay_counter = 
(delay_CTS + 10); 
     } 
 
     //zerolise all parameters 
     msg_kind = 0; 
 
 
    }//if de_ASS 
 
   }//if NOT CLOCK 
 
    
    
   if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; delay_counter++;if (NAV <= 0) NAV 
= 0;}  
   }//while receiving from CLK 
 
 
  //no station has tx during the SIFS 
  //this station will tx data 
  while (flag_CTS) 
   {//send out data packets 
    
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Data" ); 
   work->setSCR(own_addr); 
   work->setDES(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
   work->setKind(DATA); 
   work->setNAV(0); 
   work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
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   send( work, "out"); 
   
    
   //wait for 1 clock cycle 
   flag_CLK = false; 
   while (!flag_CLK) 
    {//receiving from CLK 
    cMessage *done = receive(); 
    msg_kind = done->kind(); 
    delete done; 
    if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; flag_CLK = true;} 
    if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 
    }//receiving from CLK 
       
   if (NAV <= CLOCK) {flag_CTS = false;flag_DataSent = true;} //completed 
sending all data less last packet 
 
   }//send out data packets 
 
   if (flag_DataSent) 
   {//flag_DataSent 
    //send Last packet  
    cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Last Pkt" ); 
    work->setSCR(own_addr); 
    work->setDES(AP_addr); 
    //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
    //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
    work->setKind(LASTPKT); 
    work->setNAV(0); 
    work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
    send( work, "out"); 
    
  
    //recording vectors 
    packet_count++; 
    resp_v.record(packet_count); //xxx 
    
    tx_time = simTime() - tx_stamp; 
    //resp_b.record(tx_time);//xxx 
    tx_stamp = simTime(); 
 
   }//flag_DataSent 
 




 //------ACK received--------------- 
 if ((msg_kind == ACK) && (flag_RTS)) 
 {flag_RTS = false;} //no more outstanding RTS 
 
  //delay of 1 cycle to allow other stations access to media 
  flag_CLK = false; 
  while (!flag_CLK) 
  {//receiving from CLK 
  cMessage *done = receive(); 
  msg_kind = done->kind(); 
  delete done; 
  if (msg_kind == CLK) {NAV = NAV - CLOCK; flag_CLK = true;}  
  if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 











//--------------------PACKETs addressed to other station-------------------- 
  
 {//not to this destination 
 
 
 // other station has asked for RTS and own has not sent RTS 
 if ((msg_kind == RTS) && (!flag_RTS)) 
  {//if RTS 
  if (msg_nav > NAV) 
   {//if msg_NAV 
   NAV = msg_nav; 
   time_stamp = simTime(); 
   }//if msg_NAV 
  flag_ORTS = true; // another Station has RTS 
  counter_ORTS = 0; //reset counter 
  flag_RTS = false; // back off 
  }//if RTS 
 
 
 // other station has asked for RTS, own has sent RTS 
 if ((msg_kind == RTS) && (flag_RTS)) 
  {//if RTS 
  if (msg_nav > NAV) 
   {//if msg_NAV 
   NAV = msg_nav; 
   time_stamp = simTime(); 
   }//if msg_NAV 
  flag_ORTS = true; // another Station has RTS 
  counter_ORTS = 0; //reset counter 
  flag_RTS = false; // back off 
  }//if RTS 
 
 
 //xxxx need to add a CTS handler here xxx 
 // AP respond CTS to other station 
 if (msg_kind == CTS) 
  {//if CTS 
  if (msg_nav > NAV) 
   {//if msg_NAV 
   NAV = msg_nav; 
   time_stamp = simTime(); 
   }//if msg_NAV 
  flag_ORTS = true; // another Station has CTS 
  counter_ORTS = 0; //reset counter 
  flag_RTS = false; // back off 
  }//if CTS 
 
 //any other msg received will reset the ORTS flag 
 if ((msg_kind != CTS)&&(msg_kind != CLK) && (msg_kind != RTS)) 
 {//if not CTS or CLK 
  if (flag_ORTS) {flag_ORTS = false;NAV = 0;} 
  
 }//if not CTS or CLK 
 




//----------State 1 Authentication------------ 
 
  if ((State ==1) && (flag_AUT == false)) 
   
  {//if State ==1 
  //request for Authentication to AP 
  cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Auth" ); 
  work->setSCR(own_addr); 
  work->setDES(AP_addr); 
  //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
  //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
  work->setKind(AUT); 
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  work->setNAV(0); 
  work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
  NAV = 0; 
  time_stamp = simTime(); 
  send( work, "out"); 
  flag_AUT = true;  //oustanding AUT request 
  }//if State ==1 
 
 
//----------State 2 Association------------ 
 
  if ((State ==2) && (flag_ASS == false)) 
  {//if State ==2 
  //request for Authentication to AP 
  cMessage *work = new cMessage( "Assoc" ); 
  work->setSCR(own_addr); 
  work->setDES(AP_addr); 
  //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
  //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
  work->setKind(ASS); 
  work->setNAV(0); 
  work->setMsgTime(simTime()); 
  send( work, "out"); 
  flag_ASS = true;  //oustanding ASS request 
  time_stamp = simTime(); 





//----------State 3 Authenticated and Associated------------ 
 
 
  if (State ==3) 
  {//if State == 3 
    
   if ((NAV == 0) && (!flag_RTS)) 
   {//Send RTS 
    
   //RTS 
   cMessage *work = new cMessage( "RTS" ); 
   work->setSCR(own_addr); 
   work->setDES(AP_addr); 
   //work->setROUTESCR(own_addr); 
   //work->setROUTDES(AP_addr); 
   work->setKind(RTS); 
   work->setNAV(data_len); 
   process_time = simTime(); 
   work->setMsgTime(process_time); 
 
    
   flag_ORTS = false;//reset this flag 
 
   //Delay for DIFS 
   delay_counter = 1; // reset counter 
     
 
   //random number gen  
   delay_len = intuniform(1, Device_Itvl, divresult.rem); 
    
   delay_RTS = (DIFS / CLOCK)  + delay_len; //DIFS + x number of clock cycle 
    
   while (delay_counter <= delay_RTS)// DIFS + x number of SIFS 
   {//while delay 
 
    cMessage *done = receive(); 
    source = done->scr_add(); 
    destination = done->des_add(); 
    msg_kind = done->kind(); 
    msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
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    delete done; 
    //Clock Cycle received 
    if (msg_kind == CLK)  
     { 
     if (NAV == 0) delay_counter++; //only increment if NAV = 0 
     NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
     if (NAV <= 0) NAV = 0; 
     } 
    else 
     {//else 
     //if during any of the DIFS cycles is not a clock signal, then 
check if it is an RTS, CTS, DeAut, DeASS 
      
     delay_counter = 1; // reset the counter because there is a tx 
during DIFS and it is not CLK 
      
     if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav;//set to the higher NAV 
      
     if (msg_kind == RTS)  
     {flag_ORTS = true; counter_ORTS = 0; delay_counter = 
(delay_RTS + 10);} //back off due to other station RTS 
 
     if (msg_kind == CTS)  
     {flag_OCTS = true; counter_ORTS = 0; delay_counter = 
(delay_RTS + 10);} //back off due to other station CTS 
      
 
     //---------------DeAUT Handler----------------  
   
     if ((msg_kind == de_AUT) && (destination == own_addr))  
       {//if de_AUT (apply TimeOut and 
flag_DeAUT) 
       //initialise 
       delay_counter = TimeOut; 
       flag_DeAUT = false; 
   
       //sense the media to check for AP 
packets 
       while ((delay_counter > 0) && 
(!flag_DeAUT)) 
 
       {//while 
 
        cMessage *done = receive(); 
        source = done->scr_add(); 
        destination = done-
>des_add(); 
        msg_kind = done->kind(); 
        msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
        msg_timestamp = done-
>msgtimer(); 
        delete done; 
 
        //---Clock--- 
        if (msg_kind == CLK) 
        { 
        delay_counter = 
delay_counter - CLOCK; 
        NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
        if (delay_counter < 0) 
delay_counter = 0; 
        } 
  
        //---Check AP--- 
        if (source == AP_addr)  
        { 
         flag_DeAUT = true; 
         if (msg_nav > NAV) 
NAV = msg_nav; 
        } 
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       }//while 
   
       //---Successful de_AUT--- 
       if (!flag_DeAUT) 
       {   
       State =1; 
       flag_AUT = false; 
       flag_ASS = false; 
      
       } 
 
       //zerolise all parameters 
       msg_kind = 0; 
       delay_counter = (delay_RTS + 10); 
 
      }//if de_AUT 
 
     
      
      
     //--------------De ASS handler------------- 
     if ((msg_kind == de_ASS) && (State ==3) && (destination == 
own_addr)) 
          {//if 
de_ASS (apply TimeOut and flag_DeASS) 
     //initialise 
     delay_counter = TimeOut; 
     flag_DeASS = false; 
      
     //sense the media to check for AP packets 
     while ((delay_counter > 0) && (!flag_DeASS)) 
 
     {//while 
 
      cMessage *done = receive(); 
      source = done->scr_add(); 
      destination = done->des_add(); 
      msg_kind = done->kind(); 
      msg_nav = done->nvec(); 
      msg_timestamp = done->msgtimer(); 
      delete done; 
 
      //---Clock--- 
      if (msg_kind == CLK) 
      { 
      delay_counter = delay_counter - CLOCK; 
      NAV = NAV - CLOCK; 
      if (delay_counter < 0) delay_counter = 0; 
      } 
  
      //---Check AP--- 
      if (source == AP_addr)  
       { 
       flag_DeASS = true; 
       if (msg_nav > NAV) NAV = msg_nav; 
       } 
 
     }//while 
   
     //---Successful de_ASS--- 
     if (!flag_DeASS) 
     {   
     State =2; 
     flag_AUT = false; 
     flag_ASS = false; 
     delay_counter = (delay_CTS + 10); 
     } 
 
     //zerolise all parameters 
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     msg_kind = 0; 
 
 
    }//if de_ASS 
 
     
     
     
    }//else 
    
   }//while delay 
 
 
   if ((State == 3) && (NAV <=0)) //send RTS only if the station is at state 3 only 
   {//if State 3 
    //NAV Calculations for own RTS 
    NAV = data_len; 
    time_stamp = simTime(); 
    
    //Send the RTS message 
    send( work, "out");  
    flag_RTS = true; 
   }//if State 3 
 
   }// Send RTS 
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